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This paper claims that the way infrastructure is developed, more than a boring and 
technical topic, demonstrates a regime’s character.  As the 20th century was dominated by 
Western-led infrastructure efforts including such great achievements as the Panama 
Canal, the U.S. interstate highway system, and the implementation of the Marshall Plan, 
the 21st century seems poised to be led, at least in terms of infrastructure development, by 
Asia and a rising China. Policy papers and foreign affairs discussions talk about China’s 
infrastructure development and also about delays or the “crumbling infrastructure of the 
West” but rarely if ever are there deeper philosophical and policy questions being asked. 
This papers sets out to build upon and enhance this deeper discussion by examining the 
differences between Western and Eastern infrastructure development paradigms. 
 The paper examines historic case studies related to the building, expansion, and 
enhancement of the Panama Canal, to provide a constant in a research variable that spans 
several Western-led projects as well as most recently a Chinese-led infrastructure 
investment. What was found was that with the growth of democratic standards and more 
administrative regulations, the Western paradigm has evolved, and only a hundred years 
ago, the West’s paradigms looked much like the East’s does today. Except for the fact 
that policy conditions have always been different between the two paradigms. At least 
from the cases studied, the West has always adhered to some form of liberal 
enlightenment principles enforced through policy conditions, whereas recently, despite 
contrary prevailing literature, the Chinese do enforce policy conditions, but on a more 
singular, grand, and old fashioned scale. Finally, the paper studies what it is about the 
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development of infrastructure itself that has made it the aid-of-choice for Chinese-led 
efforts?  
 Ultimately the paper makes several ambitious propositions, that need further 
research and study to prove: the current choice between ways of infrastructure 
development – East versus West – is a choice between despotisms, the Western 
democratic soft-despotism prophesized by Alexis de Tocqueville, and the East’s older 
harder despotism, and finally that “infrastructure statecraft” should be studied as a sub-set 
of diplomacy and statecraft.  
 
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Dorothea Wolfson 
Thesis Reviewers: Dr. Charles Larkin 
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The Way Through The Woods  
They shut the road through the woods 
Seventy years ago. 
Weather and rain have undone it again, 
And now you would never know 
There was once a road through the woods 
Before they planted the trees. 
It is underneath the coppice and heath, 
And the thin anemones. 
Only the keeper sees 
That, where the ring-dove broods, 
And the badgers roll at ease, 
There was once a road through the woods. 
 
Yet, if you enter the woods 
Of a summer evening late, 
When the night-air cools on the trout-ringed pools 
Where the otter whistles his mate, 
(They fear not men in the woods, 
Because they see so few.) 
You will hear the beat of a horse’s feet, 
And the swish of a skirt in the dew, 
Steadily cantering through 
The misty solitudes, 
As though they perfectly knew 
The old lost road through the woods. 
But there is no road through the woods. 
 











25 or 24.5? 
 
Arriving by train into Stuttgart, Germany, not much has changed since the 1950s. 
Tediously winding rail rolls into the hilly regions of Baden-Wuerttemberg and eventually 
terminates into a bowl formed by three hills that gather and constrain the historic core of 
the city. One is immediately rushed getting out of the train as the uninitiated do not yet 
realize what the frequent commuter does—the long fingers of outdoor platforms stretch 
so thin that people at the end of the departing peloton of roller-bags finds themselves 
behind a bottleneck that tacks an additional 20 minutes to reach the station. If one reaches 
the station at night all that is visible is an old structure in what seems to be a several-
decades-long sleep. Upon summit to street level an air of dust permeates. How do first-
time travelers know they have arrived in a highly affluent city, home to major 
internationally renowned corporations, in the heart of the most prosperous and productive 
country in Europe? 
 The dust comes from what one sees upon waking high atop one of the hotels close 
to the station. This is the massive construction site for Stuttgart 21, a €10-billion 
modernization of the commuter rail system and train station—designed to finally have a 
station that reflects the outsized economic and historic importance of the region. The 
project continues to be controversial since its initial conceptual design began in 1994.1 
The project’s name of “21” was supposed to reflect the ringing in of the new century, but 
                                                          





it is now projected to be completed by 2023, 30 years after conception.2 The 
tremendously long delays have also translated into cost overruns as the original 
projection for completion was €2.5 billion.3 What is projected to provide 75 percent of 
the Stuttgart region’s residents with much more efficient and timely travel, comprising a 
connection to Europe’s premier high-speed rail lines,4 has instead become a 
multigenerational deep scar of earth. Even further delays were caused by legal 
environmental conditions stopping construction due to a pair of endangered lizards 
making one of the construction walls a temporary residency.5 
The strip-mine-sized pit of foundational construction becomes even clearer to see 
as one ascends Uhlandshohe, the hill that forms the eastern edge of Stuttgart. Toward the 
middle of the climb, the author found himself at the Ministry of Environment for the 
State of Baden Wuerttemberg to attend a lecture by several prominent regional and state 
officials to discuss Stuttgart 21 as well as other environmental initiatives.6 When two of 
the officials were asked about recent initiatives to reduce conditions and regulations to 
allow for infrastructure projects to be delivered more quickly and efficiently, the officials 
smiled and offered that, yes, they in fact had been involved in these discussions. They 
asserted that these investigations did present ways to save time—at least six months off 
the top of every infrastructure project. The one gentleman laughed as he said, “So instead 
                                                          
2 Dave Songer “Infrastructure issues: the travails of Crossrail and four struggling rail projects,” Smartrail 




5 Kate Connolly, “Thousands of lizards delay controversial Stuttgart 21 rail project,” The Guardian, May 10, 
2017. 
6 The author visited all sites and lectures mentioned during a May 2018 Johns Hopkins study abroad trip 
to Germany related to environmental and infrastructure cross-national knowledge transfer.  
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of Stuttgart 21 taking 25 years, it will take only 24-and-a-half!” The officials and most of 
the audience chuckled dismissively but not in a matter of profound regret or disdain. 
Approximately a year earlier to this lecture, a significant network of rail 
infrastructure projects had come to completion. A new freight rail system between China 
and Europe, funded and led by Chinese initiative, has provided connections of 35 
Chinese cities with 34 European cities.7 But the truly amazing part of this 
accomplishment is that only 10 years before, there was no direct freight rail services 
linking China with Europe.8 As a generation was born in Stuttgart, coming of age and 
adulthood—knowing nothing of the dream of better connections, but passively knowing 
only a bottomless pit of public funding and stories of rare lizard habitation—the Chinese 
built an entire cross-continents rail network.  
 
A Choice of Despotisms  
This paper will examine and compare the differences between the infrastructure 
development paradigms between the West (America and Europe) and the East (a rising 
China) and the choice this presents internationally to other countries looking for 
assistance, aid, and partnerships in building public infrastructure projects. The choice 
presented has some very technical elements reflecting separate paradigms, but this paper 
will propose that, ultimately, the current choice is between two forms of despotism. This 
is the choice between a form of Tocquevillian soft-despotism of the laughing German 
                                                          
7 Jonathan E. Hillman, “The Rise of China-Europe Railways,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
March 6, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/rise-china-europe-railways  
8 Ibid.  
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bureaucrat and the autocratic hard despotism of a rising China swiftly moving across 
continents.  
Alexis de Tocqueville in his seminal Democracy in America projected that, within 
the balance between freedom and equality found in a democracy like that of the 
American regime, a tilt toward equality could result in an extremely isolated 
individualism that would give rise to a new form of despotism: a soft despotism that was 
not cruel but one that allowed for and provided the isolated individual with their petty 
comforts in exchange for a softening and hindering of any ability to achieve great things. 
It was in a footnote to the second chapter to follow that the role of soft despotism in the 
current Western paradigm of infrastructure development arose and, upon reflection of this 
work as a whole, only becomes more clearly linked.  
Tocqueville wrote that, with the growing of industrial development, the need for 
larger and greater development of roads, ports, and other infrastructure would become too 
great for individuals becoming more isolated and weak from democratic tendencies to 
complete or associate to deliver these projects, and these would naturally be ceded to the 
state for execution.9 Yet one can see the moderating and softening influence working 
both ways when it comes to the cessation of infrastructure development to the soft 
despotism of the administrative state. Tocqueville wrote that “the same equality that 
facilitates despotism tempers it” and, further, that the “universal moderation moderates 
the sovereign itself.”10 Therefore, the more democratic a regime becomes the more 
mediocre and less grand of public infrastructure it can build despite the fact that it is the 
                                                          
9 Alexis de Tocqueville, Harvey C. Mansfield, and Delba Winthrop. Democracy in America. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000), 657. 
10 Ibid., 662. 
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federal centralized government that many look to for the delivery and execution of large 
and needed infrastructure projects. Eventually the people of the democratic regime grow 
complacent in the confines of their small and vulgar comforts and merely shrug their 
shoulders and laugh—just as the local German officials did that day in Stuttgart—when it 
came to the generational delays of the Stuttgart 21 project. This is because, for 
Tocqueville, the new phenomenon of the soft or administrative despot—new today as the 
progression of democracy was new at the time—“does not break wills, but it softens 
them,” and, as this paper would propose, when it comes to major and ambitious public 
infrastructure, the new soft despotism “does not destroy…[nor] tyrannize” but “hinders, 
compromises, enervates, extinguishes, dazes….”11 The claim here is that this is perfectly 
demonstrated through the current delivery of public infrastructure. How public 
infrastructure is developed is one pane of a window that opens to see the character of a 
regime and how that regime is viewed by others—in this case, developing countries in 
desperate need still of large and ambitious public infrastructure projects.  
In contrast, China disregards the petty and naturally human for grand 
infrastructure at a grand scale. Theirs are not “hindered” and “dazed” projects in constant 
delay with only laughing and soft accountability from a comfortable democratic people. 
China disregards the social and environmental conditions in a more ancient and 
tyrannical nature to quickly and swiftly deliver projects. And so in our current time, this 
is the choice presented to developing countries in need of infrastructure: On one side, the 
daze from a thousand cuts of prying and small conditions delaying infrastructure projects 
past the completion points originally decided by those who—in defining the projects’ 
                                                          
11 Ibid., 663. 
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benefits—might not even be alive to enjoy them; the other, a swift and quick delivery of 
the infrastructure project, but in exchange for potentially ancient tyranny and 
imperialism, or at least the disregard for the rights of people and the preservation of 
balanced natural environments. It is in the choices being made today around the world 
when it comes to infrastructure development that Westerners might finally wake 
themselves from their soft and comfortable slumber and see the unworthy choice they 
have as a counter offer. 
 
The Research That Follows 
These philosophical thoughts were inductively drawn from the case study and 
analytic research work that follows. In the first two chapters, several case studies of 
historic infrastructure development by both the West and now the East revolving around 
the Panama Canal are investigated to show several important ideas. First, the Western 
paradigm of infrastructure development has matured and evolved, and many of the 
characteristics of the Eastern paradigm—quick decision making and fast delivery—were 
demonstrated in the original construction of the Panama Canal by the West. The West, at 
least in terms of the Panama Canal, has had a 100-year maturation period where—
because of the domestic influence of a further democratizing society—many conditions 
and other processes were put into place that now creates the very slow decision making 
and delayed final delivery that forms some of the main characteristics of its current 
paradigm. 
One constant characteristic that did not evolve, at least when it came to the case 
studies, was the placement of fiscal transparency and prudent budgetary policy conditions 
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reflective of the West’s commercial spirits but also liberal enlightenment principles. By 
comparison, most of the prevalent literature and rhetoric claims that the Chinese do not 
impose conditions on countries in exchange for infrastructure development and financing. 
But this was challenged in the case of their recent work in the Panama Canal, where a 
major billion-dollar investment followed Panama no longer recognizing Taiwan, but 
formerly recognizing China as the one and only true China. So in the West, perhaps we 
see the lack of smaller social, budgetary, and environmental conditions, as there being a 
lack of contractual conditions, but in this case study China did impose a condition—one 
grand condition. This shows them as possibly learning better lessons from Western 
thinkers like Mahan, and Western aid initiatives like the Marshall Plan, than the West 
itself. Furthermore, the first two chapters’ focus on conditions also demonstrates that, 
through these conditions placed on infrastructure aid, one can see the differences in 
regimes being demonstrated: the softer, more commercial, or as Tocqueville says in a 
different context, “a network of small, complicated, [and] painstaking”12 conditions of 
the West, in contrast, to the larger, harder, and grander conditions of the East.  
The last paper examines a new Eastern institution: the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), as this bank truly does not impose any conditions, and so it 
isolates the first two chapters’ focus on conditions and asks, what is it of infrastructure 
itself that is being presented by the East and China as a focus? Why does the AIIB only 
lend for infrastructure? Finally, the chapter sees an analysis and some potential answers 
to the question of whether there might be a subset of economic statecraft specifically 
described as “infrastructure statecraft.”  
                                                          
12 Ibid., 663. 
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The final hypothetical answer is that, for the Chinese, infrastructure is one of their 
best ways of showing their regime’s superiority in contrast to the West. China certainly 
does not do well as a regime when evaluated by Western standards in regards to human 
rights or social and environmental justice. But where does the disregard of these subjects 
of justice, at least temporarily, assist in the speedy delivery of a common public benefit? 
Infrastructure development. If a new term, “infrastructure statecraft,” would mean using 
infrastructure means to affect economic or political ends, one can see how beneficial the 
choice of infrastructure is for the Chinese to be one of the first vehicles they use to go 
back out to the world and present the positives and superiority of their regime.  
After these main chapters, the paper will conclude with a possible policy answer 
from the West and what that would need to look like to have any real effect and 
moderation to the current choice of two extremes: the newer democratic soft despotism 
and the ancient hard tyranny.  













The Western Infrastructure Development Paradigm 
 
Introduction 
In the wake of the international financial crisis of 2007-2010, the developed 
western world came into aligned action to stabilize the financial system and provide 
fiscal stimulus to try to prevent an even larger economic depression. On the international 
development front, the World Bank Group organizations made loan commitments to 
developing countries at a record pace, lending $100.3 billion (U.S. dollars) in response to 
the crisis.13 Traditionally this record amount of lending would only reinforce the 
dominant and hegemonic role the western liberal order plays in international economic 
affairs. But it came as a shock to many in the west when a Financial Times story from 
January 17, 2011, reported, “China has lent more money to other developing countries 
over the past two years than the World Bank, a stark indication of the scale of Beijing’s 
economic reach and its drive to secure national resources.” The Financial Times, adding 
together lending commitment press releases from the China Development Bank and the 
China Export-Import Bank (neither organization publishes its total portfolio), revealed 
that these Chinese state-led organizations committed to at least $110 billion in loans to 
developing countries, approximately $10 billion more than the World Bank organizations 
during the same period from 2008 to 2010.14 
                                                          
13 Geoff Dyer, Jamil Anderlini, and Henny Sender “China’s lending hits new heights,” The Financial Times, 
January 17, 2011, https://www.ft.com/content/488c60f4-2281-11e0-b6a2-00144feab49a , accessed 
February 1, 2018. 
14 Ibid.   
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China’s international development has become only more prolific since. The 
Atlantic led with a headline of “China Is Quietly Reshaping the World,” detailing China’s 
2013 commitment of more than $1 trillion (U.S. dollars) to a portfolio of existing and 
future infrastructure projects to better establish sea and overland trade routes to China.15 
The Chinese international development push is quickly becoming not so “quiet” and the 
focus on infrastructure development has become more crystalized in the thought of 
scholars and policymakers.  
A joint study by the Stanford Global Projects Center and the Stanford Center for 
Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law is currently potential cultural, political, 
and delivery differences between the “Eastern” (the newly Chinese-led initiatives) and 
the “Western” (United States- and European-led) paradigms of international 
infrastructure development.16 Their hypothesis – to be investigated in the Literature 
Review – is that the Western paradigm of infrastructure development is too slow and 
delayed by layers of safeguards, but has less quality issues once completed, whereas the 
Eastern paradigm is a much faster process, with fewer environmental, social, and labor 




                                                          
15 Anja Manuel, “China Is Quietly Reshaping the World,” The Atlantic, October 17, 2017, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/china-belt-and-road/542667/ 
 
16 Marc Solsona Bernet, “Eastern and Western Paradigms in Developing Economy Infrastructure 
Investment,” Stanford Global Projects Center, https://gpc.stanford.edu/gpcthinks/eastern-and-western-
paradigms-developing-economy-infrastructure-investment , accessed February 1, 2018.  
17 Marc Solsona Bernet, “Eastern and Western paradigms: A comparative analysis and evaluation of 
infrastructure development models through the Jamaica Highway 2000 Case Study,” (master’s thesis, 




One of the caveats from the first major thesis paper to come out of the study is 
that the institutions leading the Eastern paradigm – Chinese Policy Banks – are at a much 
younger stage of maturity than the leading institutions of the Western paradigm – World 
Bank, USAID, etc. – and have had less political development time to “fine-tune its 
policies, regulations, and grounding on social and environmental safeguards.”18 Taking 
the Stanford group’s critical self-recognition that they are not looking into the stages of 
political development within the Eastern and Western paradigms, this paper will focus on 
the potential for maturation and growth within the Western paradigm of infrastructure 
development. It will seek to investigate whether there are any stable cultural, political, 
and financial factors that make up aspects of a timeless Western paradigm, or whether the 
Western paradigm hypothesized by the Stanford study is just the result of a political 
maturation over decades of historical development.  
The importance of such a study cannot be overstated, for if the Western paradigm 
was just a process of historical development and evolution, then perhaps the Eastern 
paradigm of infrastructure development will take on similar safeguards and transparency 
of the Western paradigm over time, easing worries about the Chinese willingness to 
overlook many critically important externalities to a Westerner’s perspective. But if there 
are timeless aspects or factors in the Western paradigm, this may be the first piece to 
establishing a true difference between Western and Eastern paradigms. This would 
present a much clearer picture for domestic and international infrastructure policymakers 
in the near future. For as the distinguished engineering and infrastructure scholar Henry 
                                                          
18 Ibid., 126. 
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Petroski has said, infrastructure choices will need to be made, and because of 
infrastructure’s long life, these choices have long consequences. So, “by understanding 
how historical choices have been made – under what circumstances, under what technical 
and financial constraints, and under what hidden and overt political pressures – we can 
better understand what is involved in making key choices that we are faced with today.”19 
To study the history of the Western paradigm, several case studies will be 
evaluated where the infrastructure project has been financed and developed 
internationally by the United States or a Western international development organization 
in the same project area at different times in history. 
To establish the current literature on the Western infrastructure development 
paradigm and its historical maturation over time, a literature review will be conducted, 
followed by the establishment of the paper’s hypothesis to be investigated against 
Western infrastructure case studies.  
 
Literature Review 
 Because of the rapid advance of Chinese domestic and international infrastructure 
development in the past two decades, there is a significant amount of literature 
investigating the Eastern paradigm of infrastructure development. Unfortunately, perhaps 
because of the West’s dominant and established role as the traditional developer and 
lender of infrastructure projects throughout the world, less literature is focused on a 
Western paradigm of infrastructure development. As the literature on the Eastern 
paradigm will be reviewed in a paper to follow, only the Western paradigm will be 
                                                          
19 Henry Petroski, The Road Taken: The History and Future of America’s Infrastructure (New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2016), 11. 
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reviewed here. To piece together a full picture on the literature analyzing the Western 
paradigm, this section will first fully detail the Stanford group’s hypothesis. Then 
additional literature sources will be used to see if there is validation of the Stanford 
group’s initial hypothesis from its literature review. First, a broad overview of 
civilizational comparisons will establish some basic potential differences in foreign 
policy and developmental aid processes. This will then be followed by additional 
literature linking America’s domestic infrastructure development to its influence on the 
World Bank and other Western infrastructure development organizations. Finally, 
literature analyzing historical changes in the Western paradigm will be reviewed to 
ultimately help establish the paper’s hypothesis.  
 
Stanford Study 
 A joint study between Stanford’s Global Projects Center and the Stanford Center 
for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law has conducted several investigative 
approaches to Western and Eastern paradigms of infrastructure development. This 
includes one fully developed thesis paper, a number of case studies, and several different 
draft presentations that have recently been delivered to scholarly audiences. Within the 
Stanford thesis paper, a set of hypotheses was established for the differences between the 
Western and Eastern paradigms: 
H.1 Governance Structure and Project Cycle 




b) Western paradigm decision process is slower: Its projects experience bureaucratic 
drag. 
H.2 Social and Environmental Safeguards 
a) Western paradigm projects follow more strict and comprehensive environmental 
standards. 
b) The differences on environmental and social standards compliance are highlighted 
when borrower country’s standards are low. 
 H.3 Investment Portfolio 
a) Eastern paradigm projects seem to be bigger and more focused in riskier countries than 
Western paradigm projects. 
 H.4 Construction Quality and Longevity 
a) Western paradigm projects seem to have fewer quality issues post construction.20 
The one released thesis project from the Stanford group is not the only 
perspective currently being presented by the research effort. Another perspective 
describes the Western paradigm as “transactional,” and thus concerned with 
microeconomic cost-benefit analysis contained completely within the project at hand. 
The Eastern paradigm, by comparison, works on a “relational” basis, and thus looks at a 
foreign country’s macroeconomic development situation as a whole, and develops 
projects that begets more projects.21 Another perspective from Francis Fukuyama, one of 
the co-principles of the Stanford study, says the major difference between West and East 
is that the West relies primarily on the internal rate of return of the project, and if it 
                                                          
20 Bernet, 50. 
21 Michael Bennon, “Western and Chinese Infrastructure Development Abroad” (presentation, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., December 18, 2017). 
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doesn’t generate the returns needed by a private developer, the Western agencies will 
“top off the investment” to make its returns worthy of investment. This differs, 
Fukuyama says, from the Eastern paradigm, which also takes the internal rate of return 
into account but then overvalues the positive economic externalities of the project, and 
also in turn undervalues the negative externalities.22 
 
Broad Comparative World Power and Civilization Context 
World power and cultural comparison literature shed some light on the Western 
infrastructure development paradigm’s insistence on liberal conditionality and 
environmental safeguards being tied to funding, in comparison with the East’s more lax 
standards. 
The Eastern infrastructure development paradigm’s overriding trend of lax 
standards and non-conditionality will be explored further in the next section of this thesis 
but, for comparison’s sake, it can be summarized under the broader international 
development paradigm of the “Beijing Consensus.” In opposition to the “Washington 
Consensus” of international aid and infrastructure development being tied to neo-liberal, 
free-market, environmentally safeguarded, and individual rights-focused conditions on 
funding, the Beijing Consensus has two guiding principles: a large state role in 
development and non-interference in a nation-state’s governance or broader economic 
system.23  
                                                          
22 Francis Fukuyama, (presentation, University of California, San Diego, Sokwanlok Lecture: Infrastructure 
Investment as a Development Strategy, San Diego, CA, January 29, 2018). 
23 Theodore H. Cohn, Global Political Economy (New York: Routledge, 2016), 369. 
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The “Washington Consensus” is then made up of an overall basket of political 
and economic universal principles based on Western liberalism and free markets. These 
principles are not our concern in this broad overview, but the cultural need to interfere 
with principles believed to be universal is. As America is the leading nation of what we 
are considering the Western paradigm of infrastructure development, it is essential to 
understand the “missionary” role of American principles in its foreign policy to have a 
broader basis of understanding in the insistence of conditions and safeguards in 
America’s foreign infrastructure development.  
Even early on in America’s history, when it sought as a policy not to intervene in 
European affairs, it crafted the Monroe Doctrine, with subsequent additions to proclaim a 
role for America’s right to intervene in the Western hemisphere’s political affairs. This 
later was translated into a moral obligation to intervene in the affairs of the rest of the 
world first through Woodrow Wilson, but more fully after World War II.24 And so it 
seems quite natural that American and Western-led infrastructure development projects 
and Western aid funding in general have conditions tied to interfering and insisting on 
liberal governance, free-market principles, and a most recently agreed upon Western 
ideal of social and environmental safeguards. Of course, many in the West view these not 
so much as interferences, but as progressive accelerators ushering these nations out of a 
purgatory of non-Western values and into the democratic, individualist, and free-market 
societies of a universally beneficial modern world.25 
                                                          
24 Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York: Penguin, 2014), 239-269. 
25 Ibid., 236. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1996, 2001), 184. 
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This is contrasted with the Eastern view – and also other less-developed nations 
outside the Eastern paradigm – that Western interferences are negatively used against 
other nations’ cultures and self-determination, and that many times “what is universalism 
to the West is imperialism to the rest.”26 Yet the famous international affairs scholar 
Samuel Huntington wrote in his Clash of Civilizations that China and Asia – the East – 
believe they too have universal beliefs, and they believe that many if not all of those 
beliefs are better and more applicable than the West. Huntington lays out four major 
components of the “Asian affirmation,” where Asia has become more confident on the 
world stage. The fourth and last component is the Asian belief in its own worldly 
universal principles. Huntington summarizes that “powerful societies are universalistic; 
weak societies are particularistic. The mounting self-confidence of East Asia has given 
rise to an emerging Asian universalism comparable to that which has been characteristic 
of the West.”27  
Will the Eastern infrastructure development paradigm eventually transition to 
insisting on Eastern “universal” conditions of principles separate and different from the 
West, as opposed to the current non-interference principle of the Beijing Consensus? 
When America was not yet a global superpower it did not look to interfere as much in 
international affairs or the governance of other counties – outside of the Western 
hemisphere at least. As Henry Kissinger summarized the early American foreign policy 
position, “the assertion of a universality of American principles was coupled with the 
refusal to vindicate them outside the Western (that is, American) Hemisphere.”28 A 
                                                          
26 Huntington, 184. 
27 Ibid., 109. 
28 Kissinger, 242. 
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deeper investigation of the Eastern infrastructure development paradigm, and its lack of 
direct political, economic, and environmental conditionality, will be further explored in 
the second part to this thesis. But keeping ever present in mind that this thesis will be 
investigating the historical evolution and development (if so) of, first, the Western 
infrastructure development paradigm, and then the East, understanding that the West, too, 
had a somewhat non-interventionist broad foreign policy agenda early on, might shed 
additional light on where the Eastern paradigm is currently in its historical development 
and what potential factors could be evolving – conditionality on infrastructure funding 
being one major concern.  
 
Additional Specific Literature  
 Additional literature affirms much of Stanford’s hypotheses. The World Bank’s 
general slowness in readying projects has been a main criticism of many developing 
nation clients.29 Overbearing conditions relating to environmental and social standards 
have been cited as a reason for many developing countries pulling out or seeking 
alternatives to the Western multilateral development bank loans.30 
 Fukuyama, in his most recent presentation for the Stanford group’s study, also 
assumes a link between the American domestic infrastructure paradigm and the Western 
international infrastructure development organizations like the World Bank.31 Additional 
literature also establishes the major influence, if not control, the United States has on the 
                                                          
29 David Dollar, “Lessons for the AIIB from the experience of the World Bank”, Brookings Institution, April, 
27, 2015. 
30 Dollar.; Sebastian Mallaby, The World’s Banker: A Story of Failed States, Financial Crises, and the Wealth 
and Poverty of Nations (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), 283. 
31 Fukuyama (Sokwanlok Lecture).  
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World Bank and the Western international development agencies.32 This paper will 
operate under the same assumption. Thus the final section of this literature review will 
take into account the studies demonstrating historical changes in the Western paradigm in 
infrastructure development both internationally but also domestically within the United 
States.  
 The rise of environmental impact studies, most specifically the National 
Environmental Protection Act of 1970, has been a major reason given for the slowing of 
infrastructure development domestically within the United States.33 Additionally, the rise 
of social community opposition,34 as well as the decrease in federal spending on 
infrastructure,35 have also been cited as reasons for the slowing down of infrastructure 
development domestically in America. As Fukuyama, in a separate piece from the 
Stanford group investigation, says, the problem with infrastructure environmental 
impacts is “not in the principle, but in the inefficiency of the review process.”36 Edward 
Glaeser showcases that before environmental and community review processes, “Robert 
Moses built the Triborough Bridge complex, the construction of which got under way on 
Black Friday in October 1929, in just four years.” Hence, not only do these thoughts 
affirm domestically the Stanford group’s international hypothesis, but this demonstrates 
                                                          
32 Ngaire Woods, The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2006), 4. Eric Worker, “The Political Economy of Bilateral Foreign Aid”, Working Paper 
13-026, Harvard Business School, September 5, 2012, 14.; Cohn, 348.  
33 Edward Glaeser, “If You Build It…,” City Journal, Summer 2016, 8 accessed February 1, 2018 
https://www.city-journal.org/html/if-you-build-it-14606.html ; Adam White, “Infrastructure Policy: 
Lessons from American History”, The New Atlantis, No.35 (Spring 2012), 27. Francis Fukuyama, “Too Much 
Law and Too Little Infrastructure”, The American Interest, November 8, 2016, 4, accessed February 1, 
2018  https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/11/08/too-much-law-and-too-little-infrastructure/ . 
34 Glaeser, 9.   
35 “Life in the slow lane,” The Economist, April 28, 2011 accessed on February 1, 2018  
http://www.economist.com/node/18620944 .  
36 Fukuyama, “Too Much Law…”, 4. 
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at least one example of the several factors that have evolved over time to make up the 
current Western infrastructure development paradigm.  
 Concerns and pressures from Western and, many times, American-based non-
governmental organizations and political agents, have made a similar slowing of process 
at the World Bank.37 Additionally, several accounts demonstrate the World Bank slowly 
evolving away from a pure infrastructure focus in the 1950s and 1960s to less riskier and 
more measurable public health and micro-poverty measures.38 This timeline aligns with 
America’s largest mega-project era, most prominently the initial building of the Interstate 
Highway System in the 1950s and 1960s.39 This alignment of the peak of infrastructure 
development among American domestic policy as well as the World Bank’s international 
development policy further solidifies a potential hypothesis that many aspects of the 
Western paradigm of infrastructure development are simply a maturation of policies and 
political development over time.  
 
Hypothesis 
 This paper positions a hypothesis that much of the Western infrastructure 





                                                          
37 Mallaby, 7.  
38 Ibid., 34. / Cohn, 364-365. 
39 Alan Althshuler and David Luberoff, Mega-Projects: The Changing Politics of Urban Pubic Investment 
(Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 2003), 13.  
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Western Infrastructure Development Paradigm Defined 
 This paper will use a similar definition of the current Western infrastructure 
development paradigm as that being established by the Stanford project but with several 
refinements and additions following from the above literature review. 
 The Western infrastructure development paradigm is defined as a process where: 
the final decision to move forward is slow and bureaucratic; the final delivery of the 
project is delayed; conditions placed on the foreign government receiving the 
infrastructure is based on factors, or at least aligned with the “Washington Consensus” of 
fiscal prudence and Western liberal political and economic policies; social and 
environmental safeguards and conditions are adhered to; and the quality of construction is 
relatively of higher and longer-lasting consistency. 
 
Case Study Design 
The hypothesis that the current established Western infrastructure development 
paradigm has evolved over time will be tested by evaluating and comparing two case 
studies. The initial construction of a non-sea level lock-and-dam-style Panama Canal by 
the United States government, completed in 1914, will be compared to a case study of the 
single largest improvement to the Panama Canal, the building of the third lock system, 
funded by a Western-aid consortium, including the World Bank and the European 
Investment Bank, and completed in 2016. Historical and evolving paradigms might have 
certain fits and starts, or peaks and valleys, along the path of change and are not perfectly 
linear. The case studies were therefore also chosen to give a large enough time window to 
allow for any historical changes in the Western paradigm to become fully realized by 
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comparing two projects related to the same piece of infrastructure – the Panama Canal – 
but with more than 100 years of time between completion dates.  
 The case study design attempts to control for the foreign environment of the 
infrastructure investment by comparing two projects within the same overall 
infrastructure project – the Panama Canal – and within the same country – Panama. The 
case study design also controls for the Western-led nature of both investor and 
development groups: The United States government in the original construction, and a 
Western-led consortium of development banks, including the World Bank and the 
European Investment Bank, both to be considered part of the greater definition of the 
“West” in the Western infrastructure paradigm. 
 Finally, the case design is aligned along a historical analysis to isolate the 
variables of the Western infrastructure development paradigm for a study across time. 
The original Panama Canal construction of 1914 and the Third Lock Expansion of 2016 
are the independent variable of the case study being used to understand if there are 
changes or evolutionary developments among the dependent variables of the paper’s 
definition of the Western paradigm.  
 The following sections will include a historical narrative establishing the context 
for earlier attempts at a waterway connecting the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. 
Then, focusing on the infrastructure development variables established above, a narrative 
of the initial 1914 Panama Canal construction will be examined, followed by an 
examination of the Third Locks mega-project addition to the Panama Canal completed in 
2016. Finally, the variables of both projects will be compared to determine whether there 
has been a historical evolution of practices, or if there are any unchanged variables that 
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might disprove the paper’s hypothesis and reveal a core constant of a long-term and 
potentially cultural and civilizational theory to Western infrastructure development 
paradigm. 
 
Historical Background of the Panama Canal  
 The Isthmus of Central America – modern day Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and 
Panama – has been thought of as a globally important canal location since the 1500s. 
Until the advent of the railroads and later the U.S. Interstate Highway System, the ability 
for human transit and the shipment of goods from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean 
and vice versa was inhibited by the need to travel by sea around the Cape Horn of South 
America. Transcontinental transit would greatly reduce the time and cost of travel. The 
Isthmus, by the simple fact of it being a very thin strip of land connecting the North 
American to the South American continents, represents the shortest and thus most 
prominent location for transcontinental infrastructure to connect the waters of the 
Atlantic and the Pacific.   
 The Spaniards, shortly after arrival to the Isthmus area, studied the idea of a canal 
to provide a water passageway.40 The canal ultimately was too ambitious an undertaking 
and a roadway was built in the area of modern-day Panama instead as a transcontinental 
connection. The road, in modern terms, was a simple gravel trail but it was the first of 
three eventual infrastructure improvements to the Panamanian Isthmus area. By the 
1800s, the rise of United States as a growing North American power – with new 
                                                          
40 This historical context was summarized from two historical narratives on the matter: David McCullough, 
The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal 1870-1914 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1977); and Walter LaFeber, The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1978), 3-28. 
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settlements along the Pacific Coast and the Gold Rush of the late 1840s – provided a 
national impetus for the need for transcontinental travel and for the more specific need to 
build a canal in the Isthmus area. This clashed at times with the interests of Great Britain 
– the hegemonic sea power of the era. By the mid-1800s, several treaties had been 
ratified both between Great Britain and the United States and the United States and the 
independent nations of the Central American Isthmus for concessionary rights to build a 
canal, and for the U.S. and Great Britain to generally partner in a canal-building exercise. 
In the interim, an American-financed and -built railroad, the second Panamanian 
transcontinental infrastructure was completed in the 1850s as a result of the international 
treaties concerning the Isthmus area.  
 Despite of, or simply working around the treaties of the United States and Great 
Britain, France negotiated its own concession from Columbia (Panama was then part of 
Columbia) in the 1870s to build a French-led canal across Panama. What first was a 
project of national pride – led by famous Suez Canal builder Ferdinand de Lesseps – 
became a national shame and scandal for France as delays and costs continued to pile up. 
Two decades passed without the French able to make significant headway in constructing 
the canal, and in this time the U.S. and Great Britain agreed to a new treaty in 1901 
giving the United States sole authority to build a canal in the Isthmus. The United States, 
directed by President Theodore Roosevelt, immediately started negotiations not only with 
Columbia to build a canal, but also with the remnants of the French company that still 
owned all the assets and concessions for failed canal project of the previous two decades.  
 The Columbians rejected the United States offer, hoping to negotiate for a better 
payout. But after the Columbian treaty rejection, Panamanian nationals rebelled, and with 
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the assistance of American gunboats, the Panamanians were able to achieve national 
independence. Shortly afterwards, the United States was able to ratify a treaty with the 
new Panamanian government that gave the U.S. essential sovereignty within a 10-mile 
zone in which the Panama Canal would be constructed, as well as the right to intervene in 
Panamanian affairs to protect U.S. national interests. The United States agreed to pay a 
$250,000 yearly annuity, as well as an upfront payment of $10,000,000 in exchange for 
the ability to operate the canal and control the zone in perpetuity. 
 The very brief historical sketch presented above was critical to set the context of 
the canal’s actual construction and to investigate the canal’s construction as a case study 
in the Western paradigm of infrastructure development. The fact that the idea of canal 
had been around for close to 400 years before it was actually successfully constructed is 
important to understand what might be perceived to be a delayed construction season 
during the time the Americans directed construction. Also the fact that the United States 
paid for the rights to the canal in exchange for control in perpetuity differs from many 
modern foreign infrastructure projects in that generally the foreign country receives aid in 
a form of a loan from a Western or Eastern development institution to build a piece of 
infrastructure the foreign country ultimately owns, either immediately or after a 
concessionary period transpires. Despite this difference, the historic original canal 
construction case study provides factual evidence of whether or not the variables of the 
proposed Western paradigm of infrastructure development were being met just over 100 





Case Study: The Original 1904-1914 Panama Canal Construction 
 In this case study, each of the five factors established above as making up the 
current Western paradigm of infrastructure development will be analyzed using historical 
analysis of the original Panama Canal project completed in 1914.  
 
Slow and Bureaucratic Decision Making 
 The current established Western paradigm in foreign infrastructure development 
of a slow and bureaucratic decision to proceed and move forward with investment and 
construction is not consistent historically with the original Panama Canal’s construction. 
Upon the treaty with Great Britain in 1901, that gave the United States sole authority in 
constructing a canal in the Isthmus area, the United States quickly entered into 
negotiations with Columbia to build the canal. Once Panama rebelled from Columbia, the 
United States essentially immediately entered into a treaty to build the Panama Canal, 
and the U.S. Senate voted in favor of ratification within months.41 The decision was 
quick rather than slow. 
 
Final Delivery is Delayed 
 Some historians claim the Panama Canal was delivered ahead of schedule and 
under budget42, while others have claimed the opposite that the final delivery was 
delayed and over budget.43 This might be from differences in what date the historians 
                                                          
41 LaFeber, 35-41. 
42 Julie Green, The Canal Builders: Making America’s Empire at the Panama Canal (New York: Penguin 
Press, 2009) 2; McCullough, 610-611. 
43 Noel Maurer and Carlos Yu, The Big Ditch: How America, Took, Built, Ran and Ultimately Gave Away the 
Panama Canal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 98. 
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actually consider the project to be opened, and therefore accounts for additional years of 
costs into the initial project delivery budget. But despite these differences, it is important 
to be reminded of the project’s historical context. Two French companies spent over two 
decades trying and failing to build a canal. Before that, the idea had been bandied about 
for several centuries starting with the Spaniards. On top of this the Panama Canal was by 
far the largest project the Americans had ever attempted.44 The American’s had, unlike 
all other foreign attempts, opened the Panama Canal to its first ship passage within a 
decade of the original treaty ratification with Panama. With the historical debate on 
whether the project was or was not delivered on time and under budget, and with the vast 
undertaking that was completed within a decade after all other attempts had failed, this 
paper will rate this variable as neutral in delivery at least, and delivered on time at best, 
neither vastly delayed or quickly delivered.   
 
Liberal and Fiscally Prudent Conditionality 
 The current Western infrastructure development paradigm assumes that foreign 
countries receiving infrastructure development will already adhere to, or will further 
adopt “Washington Consensus” liberal and fiscally prudent policies and procedures. 
Using the case study of the original Panama Canal construction, and despite frequent 
interventions into Panamanian politics, the U.S. only intervened to safeguard U.S. 
national interests and the ability to keep the Panama Canal operational, rather than trying 
to intervene to promote democratic and transparent political procedures.45 So in terms of 
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placing conditions on infrastructure funding and development to promote liberal political 
policy changes, the original Panama Canal project does not align with the current 
Western paradigm. 
 Yet when it comes to the prudent fiscal policy conditions of the Washington 
Consensus, the original Panama Canal project aligns with the current Western paradigm 
even seventy years before the “Washington Consensus”. The original Panama Canal 
treaty between the United States and the newly formed Panamanian government 
exchanged a yearly annuity of $250,000, as well as an upfront payment of $10,000,000. 
The $10,000,000 upfront payment was not actually immediately delivered to Panama, a 
large portion - $6,000,000 million - was invested on instruction of the United States into 
an investment fund ran by JP Morgan, and control and oversight of this fund, as well as 
the payments of the annuity, were kept in diplomatic escrow by the U.S. Treasury.46  
 During and after the completion of the canal, the U.S. controlled the use of the $6 
million in the investment fund and how its dividend payments would be used, as well as 
the $250,000 annuity. Throughout the early history of the Panamanian nation the U.S. 
was constantly denying the use of funds for various development schemes and debt 
leveraging drawn up by the Panamanian government, in hopes of keeping Panama on a 
fiscally prudent path.47 Despite attempts by the United States to control Panama’s 
finances, by 1923 the Panamanian government had borrowed and leveraged so much 
against the dividends, annuity payments, and face value of the $6 million dollar fund that 
                                                          
46 Ibid., 128.; McCullough, 329. 
47 Major, 129, 132, 135. 
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they had, “mortgaged her entire patrimony and has no further actual borrowing 
capacity.”48 
 The United States’ denials to the Panamanian government on using their upfront 
payment, investment dividends, and annuity payments for what was perceived by the 
U.S. Treasury as fiscally imprudent schemes and debt leveraging can be thought of as 
exercising “de jure conditionality.”49 Trying to persuade Panama through this de jure 
conditionality to make more fiscally conservative and prudent actions is consistent with 
at least part of the Washington Consensus. The historic case study of the Panama Canal 
leaves some room for historical evolution, but also aligns that there were certain fiscally 
prudent conditions placed on the policies of the Panamanian government. 
 
Social and Environmental Safeguards 
 The current Western paradigm assumes infrastructure projects adhere to social 
and environmental safeguards. In the case of the original Panama Canal, this is the most 
glaringly opposite to the current paradigm. The United States allowed for no labor union 
presence, no ability to strike, and had separate payroll systems based on in many 
dimensions racist and bigoted views.50 On top of this there is no record in any of the 
historical narratives of the original Panama Canal construction of any environmental 
safeguards to protect the natural environment from harm from construction of the canal. 
                                                          
48 As quoted in Ibid., 146. 
49 See Woods, 44. Woods uses the term “de jure conditionality” in the context of the World Bank denying 
Chile loans because of imprudent fiscal policies and deficit financing in 1947. She then indicates this early 
loan denial in the World Bank’s history is on similar conditions that become a larger focus of the bank 
during the beginning the Washington Consensus policies. The term works well in the original Panama 
Canal case study as it is another example of a historic condition on funds to foreign governments based on 
fiscally prudent Washington Consensus principles.  
50 Major, 78-81. 
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Under United States leadership, malaria and yellow fever were eradicated by a huge 
public health effort, but this was done chiefly to make sure these main culprits of 
construction fatalities were vanquished so as to finish construction. The public health 
effort, despite having great externality spinoff effects for the rest of the Panamanian 
nation, was not done with the intention of the greater public good of the Panamanian 
nation but for construction efficiency.51 The original Panama Canal had none of the 
current Western paradigm’s social or environmental safeguards. 
 
Quality of Construction 
 The current Western infrastructure development paradigm assumption is there is a 
higher quality of construction than projects built either by the foreign national country’s 
own firms and leadership, or Eastern-led infrastructure development. Historically this 
aligns well with the building of the original Panama Canal. The American-led canal 
construction was well built for the time and used many recent advances in engineering 
and construction technology. As one noted historian so succinctly summarized the quality 
of achievement of the original Panama Canal, “technically the canal itself was a 
masterpiece in design and construction. From the time they were first put in use the locks 
performed perfectly.”52 This historic case study aligns with the current Western paradigm 
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 The original Panama Canal case study is one example that aligns with this paper’s 
hypothesis that the Western infrastructure development paradigm has developed and 
evolved over time. Of the five variables that make up this paper’s definition of the current 
Western paradigm, three - slow decision making; a delayed final project delivery; and 
adhering to social and environmental safeguards - were not aligned with the original 
Panama Canal project completed in 1914. One other - liberal and fiscally prudent 
conditionality – was partially aligned with the current paradigm. The final variable – 
quality of construction – was aligned with the current paradigm, as the original Panama 
Canal was a wonder of the era’s engineering and construction advancements. For 
comparison, the Third Locks Panama Canal expansion project will be evaluated as a case 
study to both better prove the current definition of the Western paradigm, as well as show 
if the variables align with the hypothesis that much of the Western paradigm has evolved 
over time.  
  
Brief Historical Context of Panama Canal under Panamanian Control 
After World War II the defensive and commercial importance of the Panama 
Canal began to wane for the United States despite its continuing importance as a symbol 
of American nationalistic pride.53 Several treaties between the United States and Panama 
followed, slowly ceding control of the Canal and the Canal Zone until the 1977 Panama 
                                                          
53 The historical background of the eventual decline in importance of the Panama Canal to the United 
States is best summarized by Maurer and Yo, 228-332 which this section follows. Maurer and Yo’s account 
benefits from being written after the actual transfer of the Panama Canal to the Panamanian’s, whereas 
most other historical accounts were written in lead-up or as reaction to the 1977 Treaty that eventually 
ceded control from the United States. 
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Canal Treaty that ceded the entire control of the canal to the Panamanians by 1999. 
During the transition period, and after control was passed, the Panamanians revamped 
management, raised tolls, and made many capital investments to transition the canal from 
being a break-even non-profit institution to a profit-making and financially viable piece 
of global infrastructure. Since before World War II, the United States government 
considered adding a set of third locks and widening the canal to accommodate the ever-
increasing sizes of international container ships. In 2008, the Panama Canal Authority 
began the Third Locks capital project, which was the largest expansion of the Panama 
Canal since its opening. The following section will detail a case study of that project in 
light of the variables established for the Western infrastructure development paradigm.  
 
Case Study: The Panama Canal Third Lock Expansion Project of 2016 
 Five Western multilateral development banks led the feasibility studies and 
financing of the Panama Canal expansion. The total project was budgeted at $5.25 billion 
(U.S. Dollars), and the development banking consortium financed $2.3 billion dollars of 
the total, with the rest being self-funded through profits from the Panama Canal 
Authority’s tolling and fees.54  
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Western Multilateral Development Financiers Amount          (U.S. Dollars) 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation $800 million 
European Investment Bank $500 million 
Inter-American Development Bank $400 million 
Corporacion Andina de Fomento (CAF) $300 million 
International Finance Corporation (part of World Bank Group) $300 million 
TOTAL =  $2.3 billion  
 
Despite the World Bank group’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) – as the 
Panama Canal Authority is a privately run operation, the IFC is the wing of the World 
Bank group that finances privately-run initiatives – being the smallest contributor at $300 
million, a predominant part of the case study will rest on evidence within the World Bank 
framework as the it was the first and foundational multilateral development bank 
influencing the rest of the MDBs in the consortium. This similar development ethos is 
demonstrated by all five MDBs agreeing to a “Common Terms Agreement” with a shared 
set of terms and conditions on the financing.55 
 
Slow and Bureaucratic Decision Making 
 The World Bank’s “Project Cycle” concedes that the time from identifying a 
project to completion is “long by commercial standards” and can commonly last longer 
than four years.56 But even by the World Bank group’s own admittedly long process, the 
decision to move forward on the Panama Canal expansion project was slow. From the 
                                                          
55 Ibid. 
56 “World Bank Project Cycle,” The World Bank, accessed April 11, 2018. 
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Panama Canal Authority’s hiring of an international financial advisor to begin 
conversations with the Western multilateral development financing institutions, to the 
joint agreement to finance the expansion, was almost two years before construction even 
started.57 These two years in financing arrangements can be stacked on top of the decade 
or more of studies financed by Western MDBs to determine the feasibility of 
expansion.58 The decision-making alone, with a multitude of economic environmental, 
and social studies goes longer than the World Bank’s own admitted four year timeline of 
a slower project cycle process. The slow and bureaucratic nature of the decision-making 
process aligns with the current paradigm of Western infrastructure development. 
 
Final Delivery is Delayed 
 The Panama Canal’s expansion project was well documented for being delayed 
and delivered behind schedule and over budget.59 After project financing was arranged, 
the timeline for completion was 2014, coinciding with the 100 year anniversary of the 
original canal’s opening. The project was not finally delivered until two years later, in 
2016. The delayed project delivery of the Panama Canal expansion aligns with the 
current paradigm of Western infrastructure development.  
 
 
                                                          
57 “Panama Canal Authority Awards Financial Advisor Contract for Canal Expansion to Mizoho Corporate 
Bank,” On the Panama Canal Authority website, https://www.pancanal.com/eng/pr/press-
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58 Inter-American Development Bank, “Panama Canal Expansion Program (PN-L1032) Environmental and 
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Liberal and Fiscally Prudent Conditionality 
 The Western infrastructure development paradigm assumes a large amount of 
liberal and fiscal conditionality attached to the financing of a project and on the project’s 
host nation. The Panama Canal expansion project does not disappoint this variable. 
 The World Bank’s Project Cycle process follows a detailed strategy of project 
identification through a “Country Partnership Framework”.60 The Country Partnership 
Framework for Panama details a three-pronged “Pillars of Engagement” with eight 
“Objectives”.61 These objectives illuminate the goals that the World Bank group will 
partner on with the Republic of Panama. They include the gamut of Western-style goals 
and variables associated with the Western infrastructure development variables, including 
prioritizing private sector investment as well as improving fiscal, budgetary, and 
management transparency.62 The continuing implementation of the IFC’s private-sector 
focused investment in the Panama Canal is a large part of the 2015 Country Partnership 
Framework but so are goals of continued partnering on other private investments as well 
as including a “Public Sector Efficiency Technical Assistance Loan to support improving 
efficiency and transparency of budget management”.63 Since all project and technical 
assistance loans are viewed by the World Bank as one large program for the Republic of 
Panama, these liberal – focused on continued private sector investment – and fiscally 
prudent – focused on public budget management – conditions and goals reflect an 
alignment with the Western infrastructure development paradigm’s liberal and fiscally 
prudent conditionality. In addition, the continuation of conditions and goals being placed 
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by Western-lenders and developers on fiscally prudent public management, from the 
original Panama Canal project and continued through one hundred years later to its 
expansion, isolates this variable as a constant of the Western infrastructure development 
paradigm. 
 
Social and Environmental Safeguards 
 The Western infrastructure development paradigm also assumes a large and 
detailed amount of social and environmental safeguards attached to the financing of a 
project and on the project’s host nation. The Panama Canal expansion once again does 
not disappoint this other critical variable of Western conditionality. 
 Once again, the World Bank’s Country Partnership Framework for the Republic 
of Panama has partnering goals associated with various financing arrangements for 
“complementing social assistance with productive inclusion; strengthening resilience to 
natural disasters; and supporting integrated water resources management in priority 
areas” as specific social and environmental safeguard goals within its ultimate 
Framework.64 Also, specific and detailed social and environmental safeguard conditions 
were placed on and tied to the Panama Canal expansion project by the consortium of 
MDB financiers. As detailed by the Inter-American Development Bank’s “Environmental 
and Social Management Report” for the Panama Canal expansion loan, 
Since the 1990s the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has been working with the 
Government of Panama (GPN) on the evaluation and development of alternatives for the 
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expansion of the Canal and the management of the Canal’s watershed. This has included 
various environmental and social studies to identify the potential of the watershed and the 
Inter-Oceanic Region. The IDB has also assisted with the creation of the National 
Environmental Authority (CICH). More recently the Bank has assisted the ACP and 
CICH with preparing a sustainable development project for the Canal watershed (PN-
0139), which was approved in February 2005. This project includes a community 
outreach program for [the] Canal Watershed.65 
This section shows the extent and importance of environmental and social 
safeguard conditions attached to the expansion’s financing. From absolutely no such 
stated goals and conditions being placed on the original Panama Canal project, to the 
broad and deeply studied impacts and conditions on its expansion, this is one example of 
environmental and social safeguard conditionality being the most evolved variable within 
the history of Western infrastructure development.  
 
Quality of Construction 
 Despite reports on failing infrastructure on the canal66, the project is still too early 
in its completion to assess whether it was delivered with a high quality of construction, or 





                                                          





 The Panama Canal expansion project is a good sample project to demonstrate the 
theory of the Western paradigm of infrastructure development established by this paper’s 
literature review. The decision to initiate the project was slow and bureaucratic; the 
delivery of the completed project was delayed; there was a vast array of liberal and 
fiscally prudent conditions; there was a similar importance placed on social and 
environmental safeguard conditions on the financing; and despite certain quality disputes 
and issues with machinery, the expanded canal is operational and bringing through the 
larger container ships that was the impetus to the expansion in the first place.   
 
Comparison 
 Table 2 below, compares the two major Panama Canal projects as led by Western 
infrastructure development groups. The projects are the independent variable being used 
























Project - 1914 









As Table 2 clearly shows, much of the current Western infrastructure development 
paradigm as established by the literature review and backed by evidence from the case 
studies has evolved over time. Most especially the focus on social and environmental 
safeguards highlights the increasing role these conditions have become on any physical 
infrastructure project within the West or being financed or developed by Western 
governments and multilateral development banks. But perhaps more importantly, in both 
projects, spanning over 100 years between their completions, there were Western 
conditions of fiscal prudence and financial management tied to the financing of each 
project.  
 These conditions could be claimed as obvious for any financed project – the 
financier wants the borrower to be fiscally sound so as to pay back the financing 
profitably, but the original Panama Canal construction was purchased not financed by the 
United States. De jure conditionality was placed on what the Panamanians could do with 
their own money they received from the purchase. A partial reason for the United States 
placing conditions on the Panamanians’ own sale receipt was to make sure the 
Panamanian government didn’t, “become either a public charge or a charge upon the 
United States”, as the U.S. had a “personal interest” in seeing these funds spent wisely.67 
But the American intervention into Panamanian budgetary and fiscal operations went 
deeper. President Wilson’s administration intervened often in Panamanian public 
finances vindicated by their purpose of a “civilizing mission” to instruct the Panamanians 
in the “basics of good government”.68  
                                                          
67 Major, 129. 
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 Several historians of the Panama Canal era agree that the United States 
intervention was not unwarranted or unduly overbearing, ascribing Panamanian 
budgetary and fiscal operations as being conducted with “thriftlessness”. Panama, by the 
1920s - even after close United States supervision - had pledged all its creditable 
revenues towards accumulated public debt and it had no borrowing capacity left.69 Noel 
Maurer and Carlos Yu, critics of much of the way the United States went about the 
purchase, construction, and administration of the Panama Canal, argue that in terms of 
financial controls, “American worries about Panamanian financial prudence proved to be 
well founded.” Maurer and Yu detail several extremely poor financial practices of the 
Panamanian government, including that Panama, despite the United States’ watchful 
eyes, had balanced their day-to-day short-term expenses with a long-term capital loan 
meant for public works.70  
In terms of modern liberal Western values, these accounting “sins” were just that 
– moral and cultural sins of and against the public. MacArthur Fellow, and distinguished 
historian Jacob Soll, in his The Reckoning: Financial Accountability and the Rise and 
Fall of Nations, tracks the historical development of accounting in the West, but also how 
it became to be tied in as a part of the mores and values of the West.71 Soll’s thesis is that 
well executed and transparent public accounting is the very foundation to political 
stability,72 and, “capitalism and government, it seems, have flourished without massive 
crises only during distinct and even limited periods of time when financial accountability 
                                                          
69 Ibid., 133, 146. 
70 Maurer and Yo, 203-204. 
71 See Jacob Soll, The Reckoning: Financial Accountability and the Rise and Fall of Nations (New York: Basic 
Books, 2014). 
72 Ibid., xvi.  
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functions.”73 Also, within the modern liberal West, good public financial management 
was a foundation stone to sustaining a virtuous and individual liberties protecting 
government.74 Any further investigation of Soll’s thesis is outside the scope of this study, 
but we can take his historical account and evidence to back a claim that the United States 
fiscal conditionality related to the original Panama Canal, and the similar fiscal and 
budgetary conditions placed on the expansion project, reflect more than a necessity of 
continued financial portfolio management, but a reflection of Western universal values 




Any comparison study between only two case studies out of a countless amount 
of infrastructure projects led and developed over one hundred years by the equally broad 
definition of “the West” can make no claims to scientific proofs. This paper thus does not 
claim a proof of its stated hypothesis that the Western paradigm of infrastructure 
development evolved over time as a generally proved rule, but it does provide one 
specific case where it did evolve. The original Panama Canal construction and its 
expansion project were selected because they controlled the study to one actual piece of 
infrastructure – the canal, with an effort being led by organizations generally accepted to 
be part of the Western infrastructure development paradigm – the United States 
government, the World Bank, and derivative Western multilateral development banks.  
                                                          
73 Ibid., xii. 
74 Ibid., 113. Soll’s discusses how “Cato’s Letters”, a famous attack against the Walpole government in 
Britain from the 1700s, “equated political liberty and virtue with public accounting.”  
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This specific comparison brought out two conclusions that can be further studied 
and refined. The first conclusion is that this study can be used to further the Stanford 
Global Project group’s research comparing the Western and Eastern paradigms of 
infrastructure development. The Stanford group has conceded that the Western paradigm 
has had a much longer time to develop and thus could simply be at a further stage of 
progression in process and operations than the Eastern paradigm. At least in the example 
of the Panama Canal projects, there was an evolution to how these projects were done 
within the Western paradigm. The evolution from zero social and environmental 
safeguard conditions placed on the original project, compared to the vast and detailed 
social and environmental conditions placed on the expansion project, showcase a major 
evolution in Western infrastructure development. And thus perhaps many of the 
differences between the Western and Eastern paradigms is a matter of the East being at 
an earlier stage in its progression towards a slower but more modern and higher quality 
infrastructure development that takes fiscal, social, and environmental safeguards 
seriously. This topic requires further investigation into potential cultural and 
civilizational differences between the West and East, as only briefly hinted at in this 
paper’s literature review. 
The second conclusion is that despite many of the variables of the Western 
paradigm evolving, at least in the case of the two Panama Canal projects, one variable 
stayed static – fiscally prudent conditionality. Both projects had similar conditions or de 
jure conditionality placed on the Panamanian government to run a transparent and fiscally 
sound public budget. As this paper has concluded, this is not out of the simple necessity 
of ongoing portfolio management of a bank making a loan, but from Western universally-
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believed and morally held values that sound and transparent public fiscal management is 
the foundation to a stable and virtuous government.  
The second part to this paper’s research will study the Eastern paradigm of 
infrastructure development more closely. An aspect of the Eastern paradigm is that there 
is no intervention or conditionals placed on countries where the financing and 
development of infrastructure is being done. Is this lack of conditions a static variable of 
the Eastern paradigm or are certain conditions starting to come forth in a progressive 
maturation of their process further developing a hypothesis of historically evolving 
paradigms? Or are there specific static and time-tested variables – like the West’s fiscally 




















Grand Conditions: The Eastern Infrastructure Development Paradigm in Panama 
 
Introduction 
There is growing competition between Western and Eastern models of foreign 
infrastructure development. The prevailing literature presents the Eastern (Chinese-led) 
approach as becoming a more viable choice for many developing countries because the 
Chinese complete projects more quickly and do not impose conditions on their 
investment. Many developing countries view the conditions the West places on aid and 
infrastructure investment to be onerous and intrusive. The lack of policy conditions is 
often cited as very influential in choosing to receive Chinese aid and investment.  
The research question for this paper asks: Does the Eastern foreign infrastructure 
development paradigm really ask for no policy conditions in exchange for infrastructure 
development? The recent scholarship of Benn Steil reviewing the history of the policy 
conditions placed on European nations by the United States during the years of aid 
provided by the Marshall Plan will be a frame of inspiration for challenging the very 
nature, implementation, and effectiveness of policy conditions placed on foreign aid. A 
case study focusing on the recent commitments from the Chinese to develop port and 
additional infrastructure improvements along the Panama Canal in Panama will support 
the hypothesis put forward that: The Chinese do, contrary to literature, impose policy 
conditions; at least one grand condition – demanding the withdrawal of diplomatic 
recognition of Taiwan – before making major infrastructure investment commitments 





Because of the rapid advance of Chinese domestic and international infrastructure 
development in the past two decades, there is a significant amount of literature 
investigating at least facets of the Eastern paradigm of infrastructure development, as 
well as comparing the newer Eastern paradigm to the, until recently, dominant Western 
methods. As the literature on the Western paradigm has been reviewed in the previous 
research section, this paper will focus on the Eastern paradigm.  
Most of the literature holds a consensus view that the Chinese do not impose 
conditionality on their aid and, more specifically, on their infrastructure development 
loans; that’s in contrast to Western aid, which often requires significant policy reforms.  
Several facets of the Eastern paradigm will be detailed further below. 
 
Decision-making and Delivery 
 An extensive recent Oxford University study confirms that Chinese infrastructure 
projects are delivered quickly, on time or ahead of schedule. The incentive for speed of 
delivery, though, makes large cost overruns prevalent.75 In addition, several scholars of 
decision-making theory conclude that if the Chinese become more cautious with large 
projects, this could also slow or delay decision-making considerably in the future.76 
 
                                                          
75 A. Ansar, B. Flyvberg, A. Budzier, and D. Lunn, “Does Infrastructure Investment Lead to Economic 
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Social and Environmental Safeguards 
 Scholars agree that bilateral Chinese infrastructure development aligns with 
Stanford’s Eastern paradigm of lower environmental and social safeguards, but some 
highlight that China’s recently founded Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) – a 
multilateral infrastructure lending agency essentially modeled to compete with the World 
Bank – does follow more traditional standards and safeguards of the Western paradigm,77 
while others say the AIIB has a very long way to go to get even close to Western 
standards.78 Scholars of China’s role in infrastructure development in Latin America 
highlight that because China only really started incorporating social and environmental 
safeguards into its official policies less than a decade ago, it has made a great deal of 
progress, even if their standards are not yet to Western standards.79 A further 
investigation of the AIIB will be made in the following chapter. 
 
Construction Quality 
 Howard French details the cheapness of Chinese infrastructure development in 
Africa in his book, China’s Second Continent. He emphasizes that, with all the 
infrastructure Africa needs, even China’s vast and large lending isn’t enough, so the 
funds are stretched too thin over too many projects.80 Despite the low quality of product 
cited by French and also supported by the Stanford project’s definition of the Eastern 
infrastructure development paradigm, some of the additional literature reviewed shows 
                                                          
77 Scott Morris, “Responding to AIIB: U.S. Leadership at the Multilateral Development Banks in a New 
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78 Lowell Chow, “Is the AIIB Really “Lead, Clean, and Green,” The Diplomat, August 2, 2017. 
79 Kevin P. Gallagher, Amos Irwin, and Katherine Koleski, “The New Banks in Town: Chinese Finance in 
Latin America,” The Inter-American Dialogue, February 2012, 27. 
80 Howard French, China’s Second Continent (New York: Knopf, 2015), 202. 
47 
 
potential progress in China’s infrastructure development methods. This makes some 
sense as the methods of infrastructure construction are not a matter so much of culture or 
ideology, but of engineering practice and technique. The sticking point, which is a matter 
of culture and politics, is the belief in, and the nature of, policy conditionality. 
 
Policy Conditionality 
The Eastern infrastructure development paradigm’s overriding trend of lax 
standards and non-conditionality can be summarized under the broader international 
development paradigm of the “Beijing Consensus.” In opposition to the “Washington 
Consensus” of international aid and infrastructure development being tied to neo-liberal, 
free-market, environmentally safeguarded, and individual rights-focused conditions on 
funding, the Beijing Consensus has two guiding principles: a large state role in 
development and non-interference in a nation-state’s governance or broader economic 
system.81  
The broad consensus is that China does not make policy conditions as part of its 
aid or, more specifically, as part of its loans for infrastructure development.82 Yet many 
scholars hedge this statement by saying essentially, “China does not place conditions, 
but….” Several scholars and reports confirm the paradigm of no conditionality, but that 
China does tie its loans to a condition of having to use Chinese firms and Chinese 
materials.83 One report quotes an foreign official as stating, “They (China) want de facto 
                                                          
81 Cohn, Global Political Economy, 369. 
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total control over everything (in regards to a project).”84 Even more important and 
fascinating for this study is that one important factor that China has made as a condition 
for receiving its aid and infrastructure development loans is that the country receiving the 
loans must no longer recognize Taiwan diplomatically and must adhere to the One China 
Policy, meaning only recognizing the mainland People’s Republic of China as the sole 
sovereign Chinese nation in the world sphere.85 How can this not be considered a policy 
condition? Just because the Chinese do not require reform policies like the West does not 
mean China is not imposing conditions in the more ancient and blunt style of power 
politics.  
The Beijing Consensus is specifically in opposition to the West interfering with 
other nation’s cultures and self-determination in the name of universally held values – 
“what is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest.”86 But Samuel Huntington 
wrote in his Clash of Civilizations that China and Asia – the East – believe they, too, 
have universal beliefs, and they believe that many if not all of those beliefs are better and 
more applicable than the West’s. Huntington lays out four major components of the 
“Asian affirmation,” where Asia has become more confident on the world stage. The 
fourth and last component is the Asian belief in its own worldly universal principles. 
Huntington summarizes that “powerful societies are universalistic; weak societies are 
particularistic. The mounting self-confidence of East Asia has given rise to an emerging 
Asian universalism comparable to that which has been characteristic of the West.”87 Or 
as Martin Wolf, commenting on the rise of China, said, “Like all great powers before it, 
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China will surely wish to arrange the global order and the behavior of other states (and 
private organizations, too) to its liking.”88  
 
Literature Review Conclusion 
Two main themes come out of the literature on the Eastern infrastructure 
development paradigm. Some aspects of the paradigm are more than likely a snapshot in 
time of a progressing and evolutionary process. A common complaint against Chinese 
infrastructure development is that it does not follow social or environmental safeguards, 
but this seems to be partially evolving toward at least somewhat more stringent 
requirements, potentially with the new Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank. The evolutionary nature of Western infrastructure development was investigated in 
a previous thesis paper, and it does at least provide one example by comparing the 
original Western construction of the Panama Canal, completed in 1914, with the canal’s 
major expansion in 2016. Over these 100 years, many aspects of the Western 
infrastructure development paradigm did evolve, and frankly, the American-led effort in 
1914 was similar to the Chinese-led infrastructure efforts of today. But one aspect in the 
Western paradigm that was constant, at least as shown in the Panama Canal case studies, 
was policy conditionality. The Americans placed policy conditions on the Panamanians 
from the start.  
This policy conditionality merits further investigation, and the consensus in the 
literature merits challenge.  As part of the literature review, a question has already been 
asked about the nature of the Eastern or Chinese paradigm of requiring no policy 
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conditions. Requiring one sovereign nation to no longer recognize another sovereign 
nation in exchange for infrastructure development seems to be a very significant policy 
condition. Panama provides a case study to show where the growing Chinese expertise 
and capacity for infrastructure development was not deployed or offered to nation-states 
until that nation-state no longer officially and diplomatically recognized Taiwan. A brief 
benchmark study of the Marshall Plan’s policy conditions will also be used to show what 
is perhaps a lesson learned by the Chinese on policy conditionality that was seemingly 
not learned by the West despite the Marshall Plan’s Western orientation and its being 
used frequently, and often wrongly, as an analogy for all development funding and major 
development plans.  
 
Methodology 
 This paper will test the Eastern Paradigm of Infrastructure Development – 
established by both the consensus literature as well as the Stanford Global Projects 
research team – by way of a recent historical case study. The case study will examine 
Panamanian foreign policy and statecraft in relation to its being a recipient of Chinese 
infrastructure investment and development. Choosing Panama for this paper acts as a 
type of control – as limited as one can be in terms of strict social science research – as it 
was also the same country studied in the previous section that focused on the evolution of 
the Western Paradigm of Infrastructure Development. That paper examined the original 
construction and then expansion of the Panama Canal.  
 The second reason for focusing on Panama was—as the great historian and 
geopolitical strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, writing approximately a quarter of a century 
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before the building of the Panama Canal, prophetically stated—in terms of American 
foreign policy, once a canal was built, “it will not be so easy as heretofore to stand aloof 
from international complications.”89 And once the Panama Canal was built by the 
Americans, it did become, as Mahan predicted, one of the “great highways of the world,” 
rather than a “terminus.”90 But now, instead of American statesmen like Teddy Roosevelt 
reading Mahan, it is Chinese infrastructure experts.91 The Chinese are now more 
Mahanian than the Americans.92 Panama presents a rather good case study and hinge 
point in the transitioning of foreign powers strategizing and executing on major 
infrastructure to attempt to control and influence geopolitics. 
 
Panama 2017: A Case Study 
 The opening of the newly expanded Panama Canal in 2016 was a tremendous 
achievement for Panama. The Panama Canal for years was essentially a protectorate of 
the United States since its original opening in 1914 until 1999. Over 100 years later, an 
extra-governmental unit, the Panama Canal Authority, was in control of canal operations, 
and the territory surrounding the Canal was governed and united with the rest of country. 
This time the Canal expansion was very much a Panamanian project.  
 It was also still a project of the West. The Canal expansion was financed and 
procured by Western multi-lateral development agencies including the World Bank and 
European Investment Bank. With a Western-led project came many of the safeguards – 
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both social and environmental – that have become standards of infrastructure 
development. Years of planning and several delays in construction – also becoming 
“standards” of Western infrastructure development – made the opening of the expanded 
canal even more of an achievement. Mega-projects – considered to be extraordinary 
physical infrastructure projects like the Panama Canal and its expansion – many consider 
synonymous, at least in the Western world, for delay and cost overruns.93 The West and 
its paradigm of infrastructure development, from the financing organizations to the delays 
in delivery, was well represented.  
This mega project’s opening was also being observed by what could be referred to 
as a relic of the Western order, still attached to Panama by its deep ties and founding to 
the West and the United States, but left behind by the West years ago. This relic was Tsai 
Ing-wen, President of Taiwan, or officially the Republic of China.94 When the Panama 
Canal opened in 2016, Taiwan and Panama were still diplomatic allies, with Panama 
recognizing Taiwan as an independent nation. Ms. Tsai, unlike other recent leaders of 
Taiwan, had refused to recognize a “One China” policy at her inauguration earlier in 
2016. This policy is one in which the Republic of China and mainland China, or the 
People’s Republic of China, recognize some sense of common identity and nationhood. 
She was thus at the Panama Canal expansion’s opening to reassure and maintain alliances 
in Central America. Yet what she observed was not just an opening of a physically larger 
canal passageway, but also the opening to the larger commercial and geo-political 
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influence of the People’s Republic of China.95 The impetus to the expansion of the canal 
was to accommodate the much larger cargo ships dominated by China’s international 
trade and shipping concerns. The very first ship to make its way through the expanded 
canal, the one Ms. Tsai observed on her state visit, was a Chinese ship, not an American, 
nor Dutch, nor Taiwanese ship.96 The expansion of the Panama Canal might be seen 
historically as one of the last signs of an aging Western-dominated world, and the 
beginning of the Eastern alternative, and its corresponding Eastern paradigm of 
infrastructure development. The case study to follow will first briefly outline Taiwanese 
diplomatic history, and then pick up the story from the opening of the Canal in Panama 
into the next year, 2017. 
 
Taiwanese Diplomatic History 
The Chinese Civil War between the Republicans and Communists split the 
country in two after the Republicans lost in 1949. The remnants of the Republican forces 
fled to Taiwan, and the Communists then ruled mainland China. For the next two 
decades, the West, led by the United States and heeding the concerns of the anti-
Communist stance of the Cold War, recognized the Republican Taiwan as the “true” 
China. But, starting in the 1970s, mainland China began to win diplomatic recognition in 
the West and most of the developed world. Taiwan and China throughout these times 
competed in a form of “dollar diplomacy,” investing aid only to countries that recognized 
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them diplomatically as the true China.97 China and Taiwan called a truce to this type of 
competitive aid in 2008 to improve relations between themselves.98 It was not until Ms. 
Tsai’s election, and her stance against the more friendly ties of recognition of Taiwan and 
China as at least heading in the direction of “One China,” that China began to compete 
again in the great Chinese game of diplomatic recognition.99  
 
Restatement of Hypothesis 
In 2017, a year after the Panama Canal’s opening, one where Ms. Tsai, 
representing Taiwan, watched in recognition of a great accomplishment by Taiwan’s 
most important remaining ally, Panama officially cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 
recognition of China. Immediately, China’s Landbridge firm officially announced a 
major billion-dollar port investment tied in with the Panama Canal. It is this paper’s 
hypothesis that, despite their being no formally transparent record of the trade-off 
between nations, the diplomatic recognition of China and the Chinese infrastructure 
investment announced simultaneously in June 2017 were not mere coincidence. China 
does in fact link its foreign infrastructure investment to at least one grand condition. That 
policy condition is the formal recognition of China as the one official China and to cut 
ties diplomatically with Taiwan.  
 
 
                                                          






The Landbridge Firm’s Investment, Its Ties to Chinese Government, and a Project 
Timeline 
 Unlike infrastructure investment deals in the West, and especially those led by 
Western multi-lateral development banks such as the World Bank, many Chinese 
investments are kept secretive, so this paper’s proposed hypothesis is hypothetical. If 
there were a clearly laid development agreement open to be read then there would be no 
need to piece together a case study to support a hypothesis at all.100  
 A representative firm of the Eastern Paradigm of Infrastructure Development is 
Landbridge. Landbridge works officially as a private Chinese infrastructure development 
firm; but the management of the firm is “directly tied to the Chinese government, making 
it a stepping stone toward diplomatic ties” between countries in which the firm invests.101 
So, unlike private firms in the West, that at most might have loose ties with diplomatic 
offices in terms of general encouragement of investment and transparency, Landbridge 
can be thought of as an extension of the Chinese government. Landbridge actually 
invested first in Panama in 2016, before official ties had been cut with Taiwan.102 Other 
Chinese firms had invested in Panama as well, yet Landbridge’s 2016 buying of the 
Margarita port facility, the largest in Panama, was at a different and more expansive size.  
 If Landbridge had already purchased the largest Panamanian port, how can there 
be evidence of infrastructure investment being tied to the condition of diplomatic 
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recognition? The port facility was acquired for $900 million by the Chinese Landbridge 
company, and it can be said that acquisition itself is not an investment, as it is simply a 
purchase rather than an improvement of the facilities. What happened then in 2017, 
within the same time of a week or so, if not exactly the same day, was the announcement 
of a $1 billion improvement of the Margarita port facilities.103 In official recognition, 
Juan Carlos Varela, the President of Panama, laid the first stone of the port, “commenting 
that the port was the most important Chinese investment in Panama so far.”104 Despite 
the lack of transparent evidence, many suspect that Panama’s decision to drop Taiwan for 
China diplomatically is linked to Margarita infrastructure investment,105 as well as the 
now many further infrastructure investments being developed between the two countries. 
Since Panama officially recognized China and cut ties with Taiwan in 2017, China has 
further marked infrastructure commitments, such as starting a feasibility study for a $5.5 
billion railway linking Panama to Costa Rica as well as Panama becoming recognized as 
the first country in the Americas to be part of China’s global infrastructure master plan, 
the Belt and Road Initiative.106 Similar commitments in infrastructure investment had 
been made in Nigeria earlier in 2017, with a more explicit statement by the Nigerian 
government that the infrastructure investment from China was predicated on Nigeria’s 
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continued recognition of China diplomatically as the one true China.107 In the words of 
Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari: 
This administration is very serious about infrastructural development. We want 
rail, road, power, skill acquisition for our people. We ought to have developed beyond 
this point, but we neglected infrastructure when we had the resources. Now, we have to 
collaborate with you, and we will keep our side of the bargain in all the agreements we 
have signed.108 
The main bargain was made clear that same day as it was announced by Nigeria’s 
foreign ministry that Nigeria had withdrawn all recognition diplomatically with 
Taiwan.109 Despite no clear evidence, all indications point to deals being made: Recent 
major Chinese foreign infrastructure developments are announced in conjunction with the 
recipient country withdrawing diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. 
 
Eastern Paradigm of Infrastructure Development 
 The Chinese Margarita Port investment in Panama is too early in its stages to 
investigate the consensus literature’s definition of the Eastern paradigm of infrastructure 
development, but one aspect is already clearly aligned. The decision to invest was made 
quite quickly after the initial purchase of the port. One year’s time to make a $1 billion 
investment is very fast in comparison to Western standards. Yet one aspect of the Eastern 
Paradigm does not align and that is the previously mentioned hypothesis regarding 
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conditionality. It is proposed that the Margarita Port’s mega-project investment was 
predicated on Panama cutting diplomatic ties with Taiwan. This flies against the existing 
literature’s consensus that China does not impose conditions on its infrastructure 
investments. Perhaps these are not the types of Western democratic conditions of 
transparency, puritan budgetary reforms, and social and environmental safeguards, but 
compelling a foreign country to change a long-standing foreign policy of allegiance is an 
older and more traditional condition of power politics. 
 
The Marshall Plan Comparison  
 Chinese officials have compared their Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)110 to the 
Marshall Plan of 1947, America’s large infrastructure and market investment to assist 
Europe’s redevelopment after the devastation of World War II.111 Too many times, the 
Marshall Plan is used ubiquitously as the analogy for any major foreign-aid investment 
scheme. Yet in this case, there might be at least one reason to believe the Chinese have 
truly studied and learned from the Marshall Plan – perhaps more than the West. A 
majority of scholarly studies shows the ineffectiveness of policy conditions placed on 
foreign aid including infrastructure development aid.112 Yet as Benn Steil tells in his 
recent history, “one of the great challenges in replicating the Marshall Plan, is making 
conditionality effective – getting beneficial policy reforms in return for aid,” because 
even with highly competent and developed countries with well-established state 
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bureaucracies and shared cultural norms and mores, countries can get away with ignoring 
many intricate policy conditions.113 But the Marshall Plan made just one or two of the 
grandest conditions – German reindustrialization and anti-Communism. As Steil 
explains,  
Beneficiaries (of aid), however, can distinguish between donor priorities 
and more preferences, and have their own red lines. The Ramadier, 
Schuman, Queuille, and Bidault governments in postwar France 
understood that the Americans would not concede on German 
reindustrialization or exclusion of the Communists from their coalitions. 
They therefore adapted to them, even taking control of the integration 
process… But they understood as well that they were largely free to ignore 
American demands on domestic economic policy.114 
If scholarly literature has shown the ineffectiveness many times of policy conditions, and 
the Marshall Plan has shown that many of the recipient countries didn’t pay attention to 
finer American domestic economic reform conditions, why would a country repeat those 
same mistakes in their foreign development scheme? Why not learn the lesson of settling 
on one or two grand conditions and leaving the rest to a rhetorical policy of respecting 
sovereign policy prerogatives of recipient countries otherwise? As the anti-Communist 
conditionality placed on American investment was to the Marshall Plan, so is the 
diplomatic withdrawal of support from Taiwan is to the Chinese Paradigm of 
Infrastructure Development.  
 
                                                          
113 Benn Steil, The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018) 374-375. 
114 Ibid., 374.  
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Eastern Challenges to the Western Order 
 Why is a transition from Western to Eastern Paradigm as the dominant 
infrastructure development model important? Simply put, infrastructure connects and 
opens the world. But for those who control them, these connections and openings can be 
closed, or more lucratively, controlled by way of tolling, tariffs, and agreements. There is 
also a mercantilist concern that, as the East continues to rise in dominance in 
infrastructure development, then the number of firms and expertise able to bid and 
execute on large infrastructure improvements in the West will lag and atrophy. These 
challenges are able to be remedied by the West quite obviously by maintaining current 
infrastructure assets as well as understanding that infrastructure development is not a 
zero-sum game. There is such a large need for infrastructure development that the West 
can continue to present itself as a viable alternative in development to the East. 
 The bigger concern is regime influence. This paper focuses on the conditionality 
placed on infrastructure investment on foreign recipient nations. A consensus in the 
literature and in on-the-ground interviews115 agrees that Western infrastructure aid places 
an inordinate amount of conditions on its use of infrastructure funding. Not only are the 
conditions excessive in number, but they are also cumbersome in their execution and 
compliance. This leads to the other consensus that, in contrast, the Eastern Paradigm has 
no conditions attached. This paper claims the Chinese do impose policy conditions, but 
they are simpler, grander, and more traditional in the nature of power politics. If the 
Chinese exchange infrastructure development for gaining diplomatic recognition, as well 
as in exchange for the recipient nation cutting ties with Taiwan, this is a policy condition. 
                                                          
115 For just one example, see the comments of Mr. Than Swe in “Briefing: China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” 
The Economist, July 28 – August 3, 2018. 
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And so the lure and appeal of “no strings attached” infrastructure investment from the 
East can win over nations looking for a less cumbersome investment policy than those 
imposed by Western institutions, while still falling under a large policy condition, as well 
as potentially ceding control over the very connective physical infrastructure “tissue” of 
their nation.  
 Now that most nations in the world recognize China over Taiwan, will the 
Chinese impose additional conditions on further infrastructure investment? Further, and 
even more fundamentally, if more recipient nations continue to view the Eastern 
Paradigm as a viable and even preferable alternative, what does this say about something 
more philosophic – what is the best regime? If it is viewed that assuming potentially 
autocratic elements of a regime in exchange for a more efficient and less cumbersome 
infrastructure investment, how does this influence regimes across the world? The world is 
in need of infrastructure. Potentially the comforts and well-developed infrastructure of 
the West – despite its need of continued repair and maintenance – might influence our 
thought on the desperate need of infrastructure development in other parts of the world.  
At one time, many Americans at least might have understood this, but perhaps it 
has been too long since those days when one couldn’t sell grain at the market because of 
getting a truck stuck in the mud, or a woman’s back was permanently bent by an early 
age from having to carry water from the stream back to her homestead. But with China’s 
rapid development, the Chinese  have in one or two generations felt both the misery of 
the lack of infrastructure and the joys and expertise of building modern megaprojects. 
Tom Lewis, in his excellent Divided Highways history of the building of the United 
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States Interstate Highway System, recalls the leadership of Thomas MacDonald, the head 
of federal highway building for decades leading up to the Interstate Highway System, 
Given the size and efficiency of his highway machine, it was no wonder MacDonald felt 
it was his destiny to lead America to highway greatness. “There have been just three great 
programs of highway building within recorded history,” he told the annual meeting of the 
American Association of State Highway Officials in 1926, “that of the Roman Empire, 
beginning with Julius Caesar and extending to Constantine; that of France under the 
Emperor Napoleon; that of the United States during the last decade.” The first two, he 
noted, were conducted under the rule of despots. Only the United States had produced a 
comprehensive system under democratic rule.116 
It can now be said that the fourth great builder of highways, but also infrastructure in 
general, is the Chinese. Will the West wrestle with its democratic nature enough to 
reclaim its ability to build and execute great projects of the public good?117 Or will the 
democracies of the West be an aberration in the history of infrastructure development 
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University Press: Ithaca, 2013), 20. 
117 Perhaps no better place to start thinking about infrastructure in a democracy, as well as be cautioned 
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 The Panamanian case study shows that China most likely does impose conditions 
on receipt of its infrastructure development aid, contrary to established literature on the 
subject. Plus, despite the evolutionary process of the Western Paradigm of Infrastructure 
Development established in the first paper, it was demonstrated that the American and 
Western desire to reform foreign government by way of policy conditions was a constant 
over a 100-year period between the original opening of the Panama Canal and its major 
expansion. But conditionality is not confined to infrastructure development aid and can 
be tied to all types of aid. The final paper of this thesis will be devoted to a more 
philosophical exploration of why infrastructure is a development tool. Is there something 
unique, apart from the fungible aspects of policy conditionality, to infrastructure 


















Infrastructure Statecraft: The Formation of the Asian Infrastructure Development 
Bank and China’s Geoeconomic Strategy  
 
Introduction and Outline  
This paper will attempt to create an analytical framework to analyze the economic 
and political potential and strategy of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). 
Most importantly, the question of why, with the amount of international lending already 
being done by the various Chinese policy banks, as well as the long track record and 
large portfolio of lending being done by the Western multilateral development bank, did 
China develop a new multilateral development bank?  
The framework will first use development economist Dani Rodrik’s article Why Is 
There Multilateral Lending?, which establishes one of the best theoretical and empirical 
cases for the rational advantages of a multilateral development bank. Rodrik distills the 
only reasons for multilateral development bank lending as: an information provider and 
monitor of a public good – country-by-country professional and in-depth investment and 
economic analysis; and, as an exerciser of policy conditionality on borrowing nations. 
Rodrik explains that neither of these rational advantages of multilateral lending - 
information and conditionality – “has much to do with lending per se.” But the lending of 
capital acts as a means to trigger and incentivize information gathering and the placing of 
policy conditions. 
A brief interlude will follow, that takes a look at specific AIIB policies, 
procedures, and the vision of its founding President Jin Liqun. We’ll first assume to take 
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the vision and intentions of the AIIB “at their word” before jumping to any of the 
perceived criticisms. Doing that will then make us ask: if other multilateral development 
banks, most specifically the World Bank, already collects and provides economic and 
financial information as a public good to the rest of the world, and the AIIB specifically 
states that it will not intervene by way of traditional western conditionality, why did 
China develop the AIIB? And why does the AIIB exclusively lend for infrastructure?  
If neither of Rodrik’s advantages of multilateral lending are being provided by the 
AIIB, are there other reasons for the Chinese setting up a new multilateral development 
bank? This paper will investigate this question via the framework of the concept of 
“economic statecraft” specifically relying on David Baldwin’s seminal study of the same 
name, as well as several recent updates, including Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. 
Harris’s War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft. Through this framework of 
economic statecraft, and being influenced by Benn Steil and Robert Litan’s subset study 
of economic statecraft titled Financial Statecraft, this paper will investigate if there is a 
worthwhile reason to add to our analytical framework a concept of “infrastructure 
statecraft.” 
  
Multilateral Development Bank’s Comparative Advantages 
 By the mid-1990s private markets had become more fully developed for 
international investment than had been contemplated by the founders of the World Bank 
and the IMF at Bretton Woods.118 Literature at the time reflects the “all the rage attitude” 
for investment in foreign infrastructure and other sectors with cautionary history lessons 
                                                          
118 Dani Rodrik, “Why Is There Multilateral Lending?” National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper No. 5160 (1995); 1. 
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from the likes of the Harvard Business Review with a headline, “Is Foreign Infrastructure 
Investment Still Risky?”119 In this context the esteemed development economist Dani 
Rodrik wrote several journal articles (one co-written by Michael Gavin) investigating 
whether there was still a need for multilateral development lending to foreign developing 
countries.120 Rodrik begins by asking, “Why should multilateral lending exist in a world 
where private capital markets are well developed and governments have their own 
bilateral aid programs? If lending by the World Bank, IMF, and regional development 
banks has an independent rationale, it must rest on advantages generated by the 
multilateral nature of these institutions.”121 The initial justification for the World Bank’s 
international infrastructure lending was that there were “special risks” attached to foreign 
investment and the World Bank could provide needed capital where there was too much 
risk for private investment. But by the time of Rodrik’s piece, the foreign investment 
markets had matured much further than before122 and Rodrik doubted the logic that a 
public multilateral bank was needed to invest where the private sector thought too risky, 
yet the public loans would take first position collateral over all other investments - 
essentially pushing all private investment into riskier collateral, and creating a self-
fulfilling prophesy.123  
 With a better developed international market for investing in “bankable” projects 
and supplying at least some of the needed capital, there was no longer as much 
                                                          
119 Louis T. Wells and Eric S. Gleason, “Is Foreign Infrastructure Investment Still Risky?” Harvard Business 
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justification for the World Bank in terms of supplying capital for investment projects. But 
private markets do not seek humanitarian projects or considerations usually in investing, 
and thus there is a need still for public or philanthropic investment. But Rodrik asks why 
this can’t simply be handled by bilateral assistance from one single government’s aid 
agency? He reasons, “it is not clear that the presence of multilateral institutions would 
necessarily increase the aggregate flow of humanitarian assistance as concessional flows 
from multilateral sources is financed by the same donor governments. Once again, we 
have to ask what additional role there is for multilateral agencies to perform.”124  
 Rodrik proposes that it must be in the “nature” of the multilateral arrangement in 
itself that provides its advantages. The two advantages he proposes are an informational 
provision and policy conditionality.125 By information Rodrik means that multilateral 
institutions collect broad economic and financial information that is a public good; this is 
the kind of broad based information private firms would not have the incentives to 
research on their own nor if for some reason they did do this research, they would not 
share it with other firms.126 The incentive to share information across nations is also more 
likely by way of multilateral institutions by the nature of their broad based membership 
amongst nations. Rodrik concedes that just because the World Bank gathers, analyzes, 
and provides information doesn’t mean that it is either better than private information 
gathering, or was what the World Bank originally set out to do, but it is a rational 
advantage.127 
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 The second advantage is policy conditionality. Conditionality is “specifically 
directed at changing government policies.”128 There is a tremendous amount to be said 
about the need and the effectiveness of placing policy conditions on loans. But for our 
immediate purposes we’ll focus on Rodrik’s question of, “why policy conditionality has 
become nowadays an almost exclusively multilateral affair[?]”129 Policy conditionality 
attached to lending used to be something applied by bilateral aid or on an ad hoc basis, 
and as Rodrik explains further along, even occasionally by private creditors.130 Rodrik 
explains that since the Bretton Woods era began “national sovereignty is highly prized 
and zealously guarded” and bilateral nation-on-nation conditionality is no longer 
politically acceptable. But with a multilateral lender, nations taking on debt and attached 
conditionality are also very likely members of that multilateral lender. This makes the 
extra-national, or international group’s conditionality more acceptable than nation-on-
nation perceived coercion. Even with the powerful developed countries having the most 
votes and largest equity investments into the multilateral development banks, they can be 
at least viewed as having an arm’s length and technocratic relationship rather than being 
explicitly political.131 Although this technocratic and non-political nature of multilateral 
development banks should be questioned, Rodrik is attempting to formulate a rationale in 
which these institutions could have a logical advantage.  
 Rodrik makes clear that neither advantages: information gathering nor 
conditionality, need lending “per se”, but the desire to receive and keep receiving loans 
makes countries more likely to open up their books and also accept – if not ultimately 
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perform well on – policy conditions.132 And so it is within this framework that Rodrik 
lays out the rationale for multilateral development bank lending. This paper now will 
evaluate the newly formed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in the light of Rodrik’s 
rationale. 
 
Formation and Purpose of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
The Rhetoric of Jin Liqun 
 The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is the first new major133 
multilateral development bank formed in decades, and because China’s leadership in 
forming and structuring the bank that gives China – at least currently – veto power in 
voting, many view it as a direct challenge to the World Bank and the greater western 
liberal rules-based order.134 But Jin Liqun, President of the AIIB, and a former Chinese 
official at the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, has given several interviews to 
try to quell the thought of the AIIB as a Chinese geoeconomic and geopolitical power 
grab. In publications such as Bloomberg Markets, and the Financial Times famous 
“Lunch with the FT” interview column, Liqun, who is known as one of – and still few – 
Chinese officials truly comfortable with western banking and diplomatic contacts and 
topics, paints a strong rhetorical picture of an institution inclusive to all nations. He 
reinforces it is a lean organization that simply brings the efficiencies of private 
companies to an public international institution. He repeatedly emphasizes efficient and 
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lean management in comparison to grand titles and bureaucracy as a core difference of 
the AIIB from Western led international institutions, but clearer and starker differences 
become evident analyzing some of Liqun’s interviews. 
 First of all, Liqun insists the AIIB will not be political on either side of the ledger 
sheet. Despite his disclosure of his affiliation as a member of the Chinese Community 
Party, he asks why would the AIIB be dominated by the Communist Party when he has 
spent so much time going out and gathering support and membership from across the 
world?135 His insistence on politics not coming in to the decision-making of its members 
is matched by his insistence on not getting involved in the political affairs of countries 
receiving AIIB loans.136  
 Second, Liqun lays out the focus and philosophy of the AIIB. The AIIB believes 
physical infrastructure development – as seen in the rapid development internally in 
China, as well as other East-Asian nations – is the key to economic development and that 
poverty alleviation is a likely and positive spin-off effect from an upgrade in 
infrastructure.137 There is a common Chinese saying in development policy, “If you want 
to develop, build a road.”138 Liqun riffs off this phrase several times in interviews 
including going through his own developmental self-dialogue covering the questioning of 
early Chinese internal infrastructure development, “It’s interesting to note that when 
China embarked on a borrowing program, some people thought it was crazy to put 
foreign money on top of dirt. Can a road give you your money back? Never heard of it! 
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Years later, people came to understand the huge difference between borrowing to 
consume and borrowing to invest.”139  
  Third, Liqun insists on the AIIB being devoted to green and sustainable 
principles. As China has been at odds with global environmental concerns, this claim is 
directly aimed at the message of the new and international progress the AIIB has taken 
despite previous Chinese actions.140  
 Fourth, Liqun leaves no room for anyone to question the eventual ambitions of the 
AIIB. Despite the AIIB having a very small current lending portfolio, he points to the fact 
that eventually he wants to see them have the same annual lending volume as the World 
Bank.141 Liqun’s and China’s ambitions as well as the cultural and civilizational keystone 
for the AIIB is best summarized when Liqun explains about the building of a much larger 
permanent headquarters building, “We’re thinking in terms of centuries.”142  
 
Western Criticisms and Reality  
 As much as Liqun tries to quell western criticisms and make the AIIB inoffensive 
as an all-inclusive international institution, the main philosophical points of Liqun’s 
rhetoric directly refutes and presents an opposite philosophy than the Western-led 
multilateral development banks. First of all, it is rather difficult to fully understand the 
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realities of the AIIB because its public information and transparency is ranked as the 
worst amongst all multilateral international development banks.143  
Unlike the Western insistence on policy conditionality being attached to loans, the 
AIIB insists on non-intervention. Also, unlike the World Bank’s all-inclusive 
comprehensive development frameworks that insist on multiple solutions and the stated 
purpose of the alleviation of poverty in the world, the AIIB has no focus on poverty, and 
is entirely focused on infrastructure development. Most revealing, Liqun’s comment, 
“We’re thinking in terms of centuries”, flies in the face culturally of the fast-paced and 
ephemeral world dominated by the United States and West. Whether its De Tocqueville’s 
observation of the fast paced and temporary ways of early-republic Americans, to the 
recent revelations of the Trump Administration’s boosting of equity investment into the 
World Bank, but with the tradeoff understanding that this large boost may be the last 
capital injection needed to the World Bank, so that it can be self-sustaining without any 
more need or budgetary intention from Washington D.C.144, the United States has many 
times a temporary or limited time schedule for policies and initiatives. It could be 
envisioned that Americans are constantly flipping over their hourglass making the hours 
become minutes, whereas the Chinese inherent their hourglass from an ancestor yet to be 
flipped and with plenty of sand left to fall.  
 In terms of an all-inclusive membership, as one report on the development of the 
AIIB says, “The more countries that join the AIIB, the starker the two big absences – of 
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the US and Japan – appear.”145 The differences of the AIIB to the Western-led 
multilateral institution hit at the very core of the Western liberal universal value system. 
As much as Liqun and others try to paint the difference in terms of better management 
practices and a lean permanent staff, these are merely common management teachings 
that any corporation or government at least rhetorically claims to adhere to. The true 
cultural and philosophical differences are the reason the United States so desperately tried 
to dissuade its long-time allies and fellow upholders of Western values from joining the 
AIIB. U.S. officials quickly realized the AIIB was “a deliberate attempt to undercut the 
international financial institutions established after World War II (and dominated since 
by the United States, Europe, and Japan).”146 Yet despite pleading and pushing by the 
United States, many of its longest Western allies including Great Britain, Canada, and 
Australia, as well as countries like Singapore, Germany, Norway, Ireland, and South 
Korea, have all joined the AIIB making it a seriously diverse multilateral development 
bank.147 One of the first book length studies on the development of the AIIB states that 
future historians will look at the creation of the AIIB as a historical event and, “as a 
reflection of a changed power equation in Asia,” and, “as a catalyst for further 
strategizing and action for countries involved.”148  
 As this paper has now investigated the development of the AIIB as the first new 
major multilateral development bank in decades, and has evaluated the stark differences 
between the AIIB and Western led institutions like the World Bank, finally it can be 
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asked, but how does the AIIB match up to Rodrik’s rationale for multilateral 
development lending? This can be quickly accomplished. Rodrik’s rationale – as detailed 
above – says a multilateral bank has two advantages, the provision of information as a 
public good and the ability to place policy conditions on countries. The AIIB deploys 
neither of these advantages. As previously discussed above, the AIIB is currently ranked 
worst in terms of information provision and accountability, and the AIIB adheres to non-
interference - meaning no policy conditions placed on its loans. Hence, the first major 
multilateral development bank created in decades does not adhere to either of Rodrik’s 
rationale for their need in the world, at least one based in the liberal western value 
system. This paper must turn to alternative explanations relying on the analytical 
framework of economic statecraft to better understand the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank.  
 
The Economic Statecraft Framework 
 As two historians of economic statecraft so clearly summarize, “as long as the 
world remains divided into sovereign nations, there will always be a need for statecraft – 
the means by which governments pursue foreign policy.”149 The practice of statecraft is 
as old as the state itself, and its practice is for most purposes widely researched and 
written about. One important formulation by Harold Lasswell divides the practice of 
statecraft into four instruments: 
1) Information: words and propaganda; 
2) Diplomacy: negotiations and deals; 
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3) Force: weapons and violence; 
4) Economics: goods and money.150 
The first three of these instruments, and especially diplomacy and force, have been 
written about extensively, yet scholars of the instrument of economics and economic 
statecraft, lament its lack of study, focus, and research.151 The seminal study of economic 
statecraft is David Baldwin’s Economic Statecraft. Baldwin uses Laswell’s four 
instruments of statecraft to begin to hone in on the instrument of economics.152 Economic 
statecraft historians Been Steil and Robert Litan are helpful in piecing together Baldwin’s 
definition of economic statecraft as, “economic statecraft encompasses efforts by 
governments to influence other actors in the international system relying primarily on 
resources that have “a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money.””153 
Economic statecraft has recently been refined in definition by Robert Blackwill and 
Jennifer Harris in War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft. Blackwill and 
Harris refining Baldwin’s “economic statecraft” for “geoeconomics” by defining 
geoeconomics as, “the use of economic instruments to promote and defend national 
interests, and to produce beneficial geopolitical results; and the effects of other nations’ 
economic actions on a country’s geopolitical goals.”154 Steil and Litan give a slightly 
different nuanced definition to economic statecraft but also clearly differentiate between 
economic statecraft or geoeconomics from foreign economic policy: 
- Economic Statecraft: uses economic means to effect economic or political ends; 
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- Foreign Economic Policy: uses political means to effect economic ends.155  
Using these nuances and refinements it can at least be agreed with Baldwin that economic 
statecraft and geoeconomics “emphasizes means rather than ends.” (Baldwin 39) The 
means are economic, and the ends are generally geopolitical in nature, but can also be 
economic from the guidance of Steil and Litan. The literature on economic statecraft list 
an abundance of means or tools. One tool all of these scholars agree upon is foreign aid, 
and especially foreign development aid. Though the lens and analytical framework of the 
concept of economic statecraft or geoeconomics, we can now briefly investigate the 
various geoeconomic reasons for China forming the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank. 
 
The Geoeconomics of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
 One geoeconomic reason for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is the role 
of the international institution itself. First, China was not seeing its role in the Western 
multilateral development banks expanding to reflect its own first power economic 
status.156 Second, China has been influenced and learned from the role Western 
multilateral development banks can play in the world. This may be viewed from the 
rhetorically surface level of learning the positives and negatives of economic 
development strategy by way of the World Bank to implement a better system, but Liqun 
says China, “came to understand the importance of multilateralism.”157 Simply learning 
from the World Bank and IMF to gather and distinguish economic development best 
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practices is slightly different from understanding their “importance”. Perhaps the 
importance China feels they’ve learned is that multilateral institutions can be a more 
acceptable and indirect way to extend influence in a world concerned with national 
sovereignty.158 
 The second geoeconomic reason for forming the AIIB is that it creates a 
multilateral institution with many or most of the developed world, including major 
western powers, that directly refutes key aspects of the post-war rules based international 
order as previously investigated above. The AIIB does not intervene with policy 
conditionality tied to its lending and also the Western social norm of world-wide poverty 
alleviation - the mission of the World Bank - is deliberately left out. A major cultural and 
potentially civilization geopolitical difference is being established. Here, one important 
lesson from Rodrik’s rationale can still be salvaged: that although these are cultural and 
civilizational differences being pushed by the AIIB, they don’t have anything to do with 
lending, as Rodrik would say, “per se”. It is the fact that they are providing financing 
capital for much needed infrastructure projects that these differences have the ability to 
be influential. Here we can retain that geoeconomic means of lending allows for 
geopolitical influence despite the absence of conditionality.  
 Several other more short term and internally pragmatic motivations have been 
assigned to Chinese foreign infrastructure investment in general, and these are: the need 
for natural resource extraction in foreign countries; and that overland infrastructure like 
railroads can divert energy shipments and trade from sea lanes – which are still patrolled 
by the U.S. Navy and other nations.159 More so externally, there is a need for 
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infrastructure development in the developing world and Asia.160 The legitimate need for 
infrastructure also aligns with how the current Chinese economic development theory 
that relies prominently on developing physical infrastructure.  
Justin Yifu Lin, a previous Chief Economist of the World Bank, has advocated for 
infrastructure’s role in economic development. Lin has formulated his “new structural 
economics” where economic development is the process of incrementally moving up the 
value chain of industry that “entails structural changes, involving industrial upgrading 
and corresponding improvements in “hard” and “soft” infrastructure at each [incremental] 
level.”161 Lin argues that “hard” infrastructure can be a driver of economic development. 
Agreeing with, or himself influencing, Jin Liqun’s previous comments, Lin believes that 
Chinese growth came from infrastructure development “releasing bottlenecks” of 
endowment advantages that lead to growth.162 Further, Lin advocates for a worldwide 
infrastructure investment initiative including both the developed and developing worlds. 
As Lin summarizes, “if carried out properly, a global infrastructure initiative could raise 
exports and reduce unemployment in high-income countries while reducing poverty and 
boosting growth in developing countries.”163 We see in Lin’s economic development 
“new structural economics” and his advocacy for a worldwide infrastructure program 
designed at “releasing bottlenecks” an intellectual foundation to some of Jin Liqun’s 
AIIB rhetoric. But simply to stop investigating there does not exhaust the possible 
                                                          
160 Octaviano Canuto, “Liquidity Glut, Infrastructure Finance Drought and Development Banks,” The World 
Bank Group, September 19, 2014 retrieved on April 1, 2018 www.cfi.co/africa/2014/09/liquidity-glut-
infrastructure-finance-draught-and-development-banks/  
161 Justin Yifu Lin, New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking Development and Policy 
(Washington D.C.; The World Bank, 2012), 14. 
162 Justin Yifu Lin, Against the Consensus: Reflections on the Great Recession (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 67-77. 
163 Ibid., 84. 
79 
 
motives. This paper will conclude by asking, as Rodrik might, what is uniquely 
advantageous to a multilateral development bank exclusively focused on infrastructure? 
Or more pointedly from an economic statecraft or geoeconomics view, what is uniquely 
advantageous for China’s geopolitical ends, by using the economic means of a 
multilateral development bank exclusively focused on infrastructure?  
 
Everything Under the Sun 
Howard French, in his book Everything Under the Heavens: How the Past Helps 
Shape China’s Push for Global Power, attempts to shed light on China’s current foreign 
policy intentions as well as its global infrastructure investment push by investigating how 
China used its power in the past. Reflecting his book’s title, he focuses on the concept of 
“tian xia” which in China means being the dominant power over everything under the sun 
or heavens. French says that in the ancient Chinese empires this was not directly literal, 
the Chinese were aware of the Roman Empire and other civilizations, yet they were so 
distant and far away they were, “both politically and economically marginal.” But in the 
accessible parts of the ancient world of the Chinese, “for the better part of two millennia, 
the norm for China, from its own perspective, was a natural dominion over everything 
under heaven.”164 French shows that the ideals of the “tian xia” system are currently 
being reimagined in Chinese foreign policy by building up smaller nation’s dependency 
upon China by peaceful means and by demonstrating multi-faceted dominance and 
success in technology, economy, and military, and it’s long-term outlook and “patient 
national will” to show overwhelming strength. This signals to other nations surrounding 
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China a fatalism and inevitability to Chinese domination.165 Henry Kissinger points out 
that this Chinese domination and expansion is “not by conquest but by osmosis.”166  
 It is with this lens that the AIIB’s governance structure and infrastructure focus 
must also be evaluated through. The U.S. was critical of many of its major treaty allies 
joining the AIIB, especially Great Britain.167 Yet we can see here the slow and patient 
geopolitics of the Chinese through the AIIB gaining major Western developed countries 
as members even when the AIIB directly refutes Western values. Second, and more 
importantly for this paper, Chinese infrastructure investment provides an influence that, 
“tends to be subtle – more often correlation patterns than clear casual arrows. But it is 
nonetheless real.”168 It is with this statement that brings us to the final question of 
whether there is an opening for a subset of geoeconomics or economic statecraft that 
might be termed, “infrastructure statecraft”?  
 
Infrastructure Statecraft – An Idea in Sketch  
 Infrastructure, as previously said, can provide “subtle influence”, but over time, 
and especially as Jin Liqun referred to over “centuries”, this infrastructure could bind 
together many layers of influence and power. We know from the study of nation-states 
that physical infrastructure is one of many factors, but a very important one, to unify 
territory.169 The ability to link territories together and have a centralized state be able to 
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reach far off territory and citizens has been referred to as “infrastructure power”.170 Many 
scholars have understood infrastructure to be more than a question of economics and just 
as much for a national or territorial political mean.171 So perhaps another potential 
motivation for the AIIB’s focus on infrastructure is in a subtle and indirect way by the 
legitimacy of partnership with many Western developed nations, to expand and advance 
influence through infrastructure development. Justin Yifu Lin attributes China’s initial 
stagnation to its ancient bureaucratic ways that would not accept the experimental nature 
and testing of the scientific revolution.172 Yet now China has full grasp of the scientific 
and technological process and deployment of infrastructure mega-project development. 
These modern and scientific tools are now being deployed to link and bind even the areas 
of the ancient Roman Empire – the once marginal and far off Europe – to the Chinese 
state.173 They might very well rank as the best at this now that the West has in many 
ways ceded this ground due to the social, environmental, and budgetary risks associated 
with such projects. So as the modern-state is even more systemically linked through 
physical infrastructure and deploying modern science and technology, the modern 
scientific Chinese state expands and slowly ties many nations under its influence by way 
of infrastructure development. Yet here again, as has dangerously happened before since 
the advent of the modern scientific world, science and technology are not beholden and 
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linked like at the height of the Enlightenment to western liberal values of human rights,  
political representation, etc.  
 The final hypothetical answer is that for the Chinese, infrastructure is one of their 
best ways of showing their regime’s superiority in contrast to the West. Infrastructure 
development is a great collective action that disturbs lives, terrain, and the natural 
environment. It relocates people from their historic neighborhoods and lands. China 
certainly does not do well as a regime when evaluated by Western standards in regards to 
human rights, or social and environmental justice, but what of the major public benefited 
still in desperate need by developing countries, where the disregard of these subjects of 
justice, at least temporarily, assists in the speedy delivery of that benefit? – Infrastructure 
development. If a new term, “infrastructure statecraft” would mean using infrastructure 
means to effect economic or political ends, one can see how beneficial the choice of 
infrastructure is for the Chinese to choose to be one of the first vehicles they use to go 
back out to the world and present themselves and the positives of their regime.  
This involves further investigation, but perhaps it might warrant its own subset 
terminology as “infrastructure statecraft”.  
 
Conclusions 
 This paper has used Dani Rodrik’s rationale for multilateral development lending 
to show that from at least this Western liberal perspective, there isn’t a natural advantage 
attributable to multilateral institutions being used by the newest major multilateral 
development bank – The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank does not currently have a well-regarded public information provisional 
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capacity, and it does not use conditionality to effect national policy change on its 
borrowers. The AIIB also has a strict and exclusive focus on infrastructure development. 
We next used the analytical framework of economic statecraft or geoeconomics to further 
investigate motivations, means, and ends of the AIIB. Although there was some partial 
satisfactory linkages between the AIIB’s President Jin Liqun’s interview rhetoric with 
development economist Justin Yifu Lin’s academic theory of infrastructure investment as 
a major component of his “new structural economics,” this still left some room for 
questioning. This paper concluded with the thought that perhaps there could be a subset 
of economic statecraft or geoeconomics called “infrastructure statecraft”. This derives 
from infrastructure’s ability to bind and pull territory and people closer to centers of 
power and to expand a nation’s influence, but this can be achieved by way of relatively 
peaceful and non-military – geoeconomic – means. More investigation and further 
building of an analytical framework is needed to truly move forward with “infrastructure 
statecraft” as a needed and unique subset of geoeconomics. But the use of economic 
means by way of infrastructure development should be at least thought of in terms of Sun 
Tzu who said, “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” By using 
the modern technology and science of infrastructure development, the Chinese may be 
achieving their ancient empirical ambitions by way of the indirect and “legitimate” means 
of a multilateral development bank focused on the binding and distance shortening 







 In the preceding three chapters, some of the differences between the 
Western and Eastern paradigms of infrastructure development are brought to light, at 
least as they currently stand. In the first two chapters, several case studies of historic 
infrastructure development by both the West and now the East revolving around the 
Panama Canal were investigated to show several important ideas. The Western paradigm 
of infrastructure development has matured and evolved, and many of the characteristics 
of the Eastern paradigm, quick decision making and fast delivery, were demonstrated in 
the original construction of the Panama Canal by the West. Domestic influence of a 
further democratizing society likely created the very slow decision making and delayed 
final delivery that forms some of the main characteristics of the West’s current paradigm. 
One constant though was the West’s insistence on placing policy conditions on the 
infrastructure funding. So, despite the sense that perhaps the differences between East 
and West are merely evolutionary and technical, we see a steady characteristic constant in 
the West. 
In contrast, prevalent literature and rhetoric claims that the Chinese do not impose 
conditions on countries in exchange for infrastructure development and financing. But 
this was challenged in the case of their recent work in the Panama Canal, where a major 
billion-dollar investment followed Panama no longer recognizing Taiwan but formerly 
recognizing internationally the People’s Republic of China. History will need to stretch 
longer to give us a more definitive answer, but Panama’s experience with the slow and 
painstaking process of the Canal’s most recent Western-led expansion might very well 
have compelled them to look to China to provide swift and efficient investment and 
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upgrades to the Canal—Panama’s prized jewel of economic prosperity—even if it meant 
setting aside one of their longest allies (Taiwan). 
The last chapter examines a new Eastern institution: the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB). This bank doesn’t place conditions on its financing and, 
therefore, one must ask what is it of infrastructure itself that is being presented by the 
East and China as a focus? Why does the AIIB only lend for infrastructure?  
This paper proposes a bold idea and answer: For the Chinese, infrastructure is one 
of their best ways of showing their regime’s superiority in contrast to the West. Put 
simply, where does the disregard for social and environmental conditions, human rights, 
democratic values, and transparent and prudent financial responsibility assist in the 
speedy delivery of a common public benefit? Infrastructure development. This paper 
proposes then a term: “infrastructure statecraft,” defined as using infrastructure means to 
affect economic or political ends. This paper then concludes how beneficial the choice of 
infrastructure is for the Chinese to be one of the first foreign policy vehicles they use to 
go back out to the world and present the positives and superiority of their regime.  
 Perhaps in the West it is easier to see the despotism of the East and the Chinese 
regime dominated by an oligarchy of the Communist Party and further being consolidated 
under the rule of Xi Jinping. But it is harder to see ourselves. Clothed in the rhetoric of a 
restless and innovative bastion of liberty, we’ve grown blind if not willfully tolerant of 
the long delays and small and petty ambitions of our way of developing infrastructure. 
The process takes multiple generations to deliver and is weighed down by a hundred 
paper cuts from conditional policies shuffled by Tocqueville’s new faceless and benign 
soft despot. This is what is presented to other countries, those still developing and those 
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already developed and now in need of expansion and maintenance to their already built 
infrastructure portfolio. The West sometimes still lulls itself into believing they present a 
“superior product” to the cheapness of the East. This is not a choice that should be 
desired to continue to be presented to the outside world, let alone domestically. 
 So therefore, the last question of this paper is naturally: What is the West doing to 
present a better choice? Is there any way to moderate the extremes of choice between 
paradigms of infrastructure development?  
 As part of the United States Build Act of 2018, there were legislative provisions 
to consolidate certain functions of several existing aid and development agencies into a 
new agency known as the United States Development Finance Corporation (DFC). 
Proposed by the Trump Administration as an answer to a rising China and the spreading 
of the Eastern paradigm of infrastructure development,174 one may peg hopes upon this 
new outfit. The DFC contends to offer a difference from the state-led approach of the 
East and China with private market solutions and equity investments rather than debt 
burdening.175 But these private sector solutions will do nothing to differentiate this 
agency from the current paradigm if it does not moderate its ability to deliver projects 
quickly and in a timely fashion. The agency itself should be infused with an older 
democratic unruliness and pride in the capacity for a free people to achieve great things 
for their own domestic concerns as well as internationally. There is a small chance that 
perhaps a new agency with laser-like focus on a superior democratic infrastructure 
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development—much like how the Forest Service did its work early on176—might be able 
to bring forth this style of culture and dedication. But how feasible this will be seems 
slim when, instead of an entirely new agency being formed, the DFC will likely just 
combine elements of already functioning agencies operating in the current slow and soft 
paradigm.177  
 One important item learned from the case studies is that the Western paradigm 
matured and evolved from the inside out, from domestic reforms then quickly outwards 
to infrastructure aid projects in foreign countries. What is likely most needed is a 
moderating reform back to an infusion of local projects backed by independent 
associations of sponsors and interested residents outside the scope of the current 
paradigm. These independent associations need to be focused on the old adage of “getting 
things done” rather than figuring out ways to stop publically beneficial infrastructure 
projects from happening. This moderating reform may be able to infuse itself into the 
mores of the Western regimes and then be transferred back out to the rest of the world. 
Perhaps efforts like this paper will contribute a small part to the ability for self-reflection 
and to moderate habits formed over years of democratic rule and isolating individualism. 
This more moderating “get things done” attitude, found among enough Westerners that 
they come together to deliver beneficial projects, might be the best hope in presenting an 
alternative to the currently despotic paradigms of choice available to a country in need of 
public infrastructure development and improvements. Another potential assistance in 
moderating the current Western paradigm back to some semblance of balance between 
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freedom, democracy, and publically beneficially infrastructure improvements would be to 
study historic cases other than just the Panama Canal, where the liberal democracies 
achieved and delivered great infrastructure projects in a relatively efficient and timely 
manner.  
 This paper brings to light a few actually substantial claims. First and foremost, 
this paper proposes that the development of public infrastructure—the way public 
infrastructure gets built—provides a focused and qualitatively calculative way to judge 
the type, character, and health of a regime. The development of infrastructure is an 
important story to all regimes, and although it generally gets covered in history and 
popular biography, infrastructure is never deeply studied in a way to provide substance to 
philosophical and policy debates. Of course, infrastructure many times is looked at as a 
lower field of study or realm than, say, diplomacy or civil rights, but one can see from 
this paper that infrastructure influences and works hand-in-hand with the very heights of 
diplomacy and foreign affairs. 
 In fact, the second claim of the paper is that infrastructure informs a subset of 
diplomatic statecraft and international relations that we should term “infrastructure 
statecraft.” And this form of statecraft is used at this time most effectively by the Chinese 
regime because the nature of infrastructure development naturally favors the autocratic 
versus the democratic. 
 But these claims are broad and ambitious. They are propositions rather than 
proofs. This paper’s defense has several thin lines spread in the middle and the flanks that 
will need future reinforcements. For example, one would either need a portfolio of other 
case studies to show how the Western infrastructure development paradigm has matured 
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and evolved, and it may even need a full-blown history of showing democratic evolution 
and infrastructure evolution marching, if not in unison and linear, close together and in a 
discernable pattern. 
 Second, with the lack of transparency in Chinese development matters, it will be 
difficult to build up the case of whether the Chinese demand policy and other conditions 
on their infrastructure aid and loans to other nations. In fact, the example used about 
Panama in chapter two relies on the best-case speculation and reporting of others, rather 
than cold-hard written contractual evidence. To try to address this would likely mean 
building a database of a nation’s relationship between denouncing Taiwan and receiving 
Chinese aid. If there is something like that already produced, then the research for this 
paper did not find it, and it would have provided great comfort and better work on the 
study if it had been developed. 
 Hence the conclusions from the research work within this paper are limited to the 
scope of its reach. Far more is needed to understand if there is really the need to 
categorize a sub-field of study “infrastructure statecraft,” but it is this paper’s most 
audacious claim that it is worth pursuing the need of a new sub-field of international 
relations in the first place.  
The heat from the audacity can be cooled from the quoting of a long passage from 
The Power Broker where Robert Caro recounts Raymond Moley’s perspective that,  
from the pyramids of Egypt, the rebuilding of Rome after Nero’s fire, to 
the creation of the great medieval cathedrals…all great public works have 
been somehow associated with autocratic power.” It was no accident that 
most of the world’s great roads—ancient and modern alike—had been 
associated with totalitarian regimes, that it took a great Khan to build the 
great roads of Asia, a Darius to build the Royal Road across Asia Minor, a 
Hitler and a Mussolini to build the Autobahnen and autostrade of Europe, 
that during the four hundred years in which Rome was a republic it built 
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relatively few major roads, its broad highways beginning to march across 
the known earth only after the decrees calling for their construction began 
to be sent forth from the Capitol by a Caesar rather than a Senate. Whether 
or not it is true, as Moley claims, that “pure democracy has neither the 
imagination, nor the energy, nor the disciplined mentality to create major 
improvements,” it is indisputably true that it is far easier for a totalitarian 
regime to take the resources to such improvements, far easier for it to 
mobilize the men necessary to plan and build them; the great highways of 
antiquity awaited the formation of regimes capable of assigning to their 
construction great masses of men (Rome’s were built in large part by the 
legions who were to tramp along them); at times, the great highways of the 
modern age seemed to be awaiting some force capable of assigning to 
their planning the hundreds of engineers, architects and technicians 
necessary to plan them. And most important, it is far easier for a 
totalitarian regime to ignore the wishes of its people, for its power does 
not derive from the people. Under such a regime it is not necessary for 
masses of people to be persuaded of an improvement’s worth; the 
persuasion of a single mind is sufficient.178 
 
These are sobering words if one is a Western liberal devoutly tied to 
individualism and freedom yet understanding the need for public infrastructure 
improvement for a prosperous nation. It brings one to a further study that is well outside 
the scope of this work but brings out the most basic questions of politics: How was 
America, leading the Western expansion of democracy, capable of building the canals, 
the railroads, the dams, the interstate highway system, the electric grid, etc.? What were 
the political circumstances? In what ways were things different that provided a conducive 
environment that does not exist today? Who ruled? For whom? What was just then and is 
not now?  
This thesis suggests that understanding the relatively narrow field of infrastructure 
development can be a way of understanding the broader topic of a regime’s character. 
But likewise, coming to a better understanding of the theory of democratic soft despotism 
                                                          




as Tocqueville understood it might be a first step towards reforming the West’s practical 
approach to infrastructure development. Small practical reforms will likely just be 
trimming around the edges of the process of attempting to find a more efficient and better 
way to development infrastructure in a democracy. A change in the mores and a certain 
unruliness or democratic unrest positively channeled into this as well as other practical 
policy fields may better ensure the sustainability of the western liberal order, and provide 
a better and more moderate choice for other countries and regime’s looking for 
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